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variation is not too large. Then we consider interlinked contracts that have both tenancy
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1 Introduction
Over the years, sharecropping has remained a widely prevalent, and perhaps the most con-
troversial, tenurial system in agriculture. While writings on this institution can be traced
back earlier, modern economic theories of sharecropping are centered around its criticism
of Alfred Marshall (1920). The essence of the Marshallian critique is that sharecropping
is an inefficient system. Under a share contract, the tenant-cultivator pays the landlord a
stipulated proportion of the output. This leads to suboptimal application of inputs: even
though there is gain in surplus from employing additional inputs, it does not pay the tenant
to do so since he keeps only a fraction of the marginal product. In contrast, the tenant has
the incentive to maximize the surplus under a fixed rental contract where he keeps the entire
output and pays only a fixed rent to the landlord. The landlord, who usually has the bar-
gaining power, can then extract the entire additional surplus by appropriately determining
the rent. Thus, apart from being inefficient, sharecropping is also apparently suboptimal for
the landlord. The wide prevalence of this institution has therefore remained a puzzle and
several theories have been put forward to explain its existence. In particular, it has been
argued that sharecropping can be explained by the trade-off between risk-sharing and in-
centive provision (Stiglitz, 1974; Newbery, 1977; Newbery and Stiglitz, 1979), informational
asymmetry (Hallagan, 1978; Allen, 1982; Muthoo, 1998), moral hazard (Reid, 1976; Eswaran
and Kotwal, 1985; Laffont and Matoussi, 1995; Ghatak and Pandey, 2000) or limited liability
(Shetty, 1988; Basu, 1992; Sengupta, 1997; Ray and Singh, 2001).1
The present paper is motivated by an aspect of agriculture that has not received much
attention in the theoretical literature of sharecropping. Given that the core of the contention
here is sharing of the agricultural product between the contracting parties, a natural question
is: does the price behavior in agriculture influence the resulting tenancy contracts? This
question is usually sidestepped in the existing literature of sharecropping as it is always
implicitly assumed that price is competitively determined in agriculture and the contracting
parties take the same price as given. While price in agriculture is often regarded to be
competitive, it is also well-known that it does exhibit variation—seasonal, spatial or both.
The seasonal variation has a broad pattern: the price is the lowest right after the harvest,
then it rises and finally reaches its peak just before the next harvest.2 In less-developed
agrarian economies, a landlord can take advantage of price variations by ‘hoarding’ (i.e.,
storing the output for a few months and sell it when the price is high) or transporting the
produce to a location that offers a better price (e.g., from the village to the town market).
A tenant-farmer, on the other hand, has to sell the output at low price immediately after
the harvest due to various reasons such as not having enough buffer wealth to pay for
1See also Cheung (1969), Bardhan and Srinivasan (1971), Bardhan (1984), Binswanger and Rosenzweig
(1984), Hayami and Otsuka (1993) and recent papers of Ray (1999) and Roy and Serfes (2001). The literature
of sharecropping is enormous and we do not attempt to summarize it here. We refer to Singh (1989) for a
comprehensive survey.
2For example, the Summary Report (2000: 8) of Bangladesh Agricultural Research Council states: “The
overall findings of the market survey regarding the prices of rice over the twelve months indicate that there
had been seasonal variation of prices of rice and other foodgrains. The average retail price of coarse rice
in the selected three regions reached its peak (Tk.16.05/kg) in Chaitra (mid-March to mid-April) and went
down to its minimum (Tk.11.12/kg) in Jaiyastha (mid-May to mid-June). This means pre-harvesting price
of rice was the highest and the immediate post-harvesting price was the lowest with a 44.3 percent difference
from the minimum to maximum prices.”
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essential commodities for immediate consumption, urgency for clearing his debts or the lack
of necessary storage and transportation facilities. Generally speaking, one can say that a
landlord has better access to the market and as a result the price that he receives for the
produce is higher than the price received by the tenant. We argue that that this innate
difference of the two parties can explain sharecropping even in the absence of factors such
as risk aversion or informational asymmetry. The underlying intuition is simple. A fixed
rental contract leaves the entire output with the tenant. Since the tenant receives a low price
for the output, the revenue and consequently the rent to the landlord is low. The landlord
may prefer a share contract because it enables him to take advantage of price variation by
allowing him to keep a proportion of the output.
We formalize the intuition above in a landlord-tenant model with seasonal variation
of price, where the tenant receives a low price for his output while the landlord can sell
his output at a higher price by incurring a cost of storage, and show the superiority of
sharecropping over fixed rental contracts. We also consider another type of contracts that
seem to arise naturally in this setting. These are “crop-buying” contracts, where the landlord
specifies a price at which he buys the entire output from the tenant. We show that as long as
the price variation is not too large, sharecropping dominates crop-buying contracts. A crop-
buying contract is high-incentive in nature, enabling the landlord to have a higher output,
but the downside is he pays the tenant a high unit price to get this output. Under a share
contract, the landlord keeps a share of relatively low output, but his unit profit margin is
higher since he has to make no payment for this share. If the price variation is not too high,
the gain from higher volume of output is outweighed by the loss from lower unit profit and
the landlord prefers sharecropping over crop-buying contracts.
After analyzing tenancy and crop-buying contracts separately, we subsequently consider
more general contracts where the landlord specifies the shares for both parties, a rental
transfer and a price at which he offers to buy the tenant’s share of output. These are
interlinked contracts that enable the landlord to interact with the tenant in two markets:
land (through share and rent) and product (through his offer of price).3 We show that the
landlord has multiple optimal interlinked contracts. The intuition behind the multiplicity is
simple. The tenant’s incentive is determined by (i) his share and (ii) the price he receives
for his share, so the optimal level of incentive can be sustained by multiple combinations of
these two variables. To resolve this multiplicity, we appeal to the nature of the rural product
markets and propose an equilibrium refinement that takes into consideration the fact that
although the landlord has monopoly power over the land he owns, this is not necessarily
the case in the product market, where he could face competition from other entities (e.g.,
traders, intermediaries) who might be interested in trading with the tenant. In fact, a rural
product market closely resembles what one might call a situation of imperfect competition,
in the line suggested by Stiglitz (1989: 25):
“There is competition; inequality of wealth itself does not imply that landlords can
exercise their power unbridled. On the other hand, markets in which there are a
3The theoretical literature on interlinkage has mainly focused on credit contracts, considering (i) land-
credit linkage (e.g., Bhaduri, 1973; Braverman & Stiglitz, 1982; Mitra, 1982; Basu, 1983; Bardhan, 1984;
Gangopadhyay & Sengupta, 1986; Ray & Sengupta, 1989; Banerji, 1995; Basu et al., 2000) and (ii) product-
credit linkage (e.g., Gangopadhyay & Sengupta, 1987; Bell & Srinivasan, 1989). See also Chapter 14 of Basu
(1998) and Chapter 9 of Bardhan and Udry (1999).
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large number of participants...need not be highly competitive...transaction costs and,
in particular, information costs imply that some markets are far better described by
models of imperfect competition than perfect competition.”
The refinement criterion we propose incorporates imperfect competition in the following way.
Suppose there is a small but positive probability that a third agent (who can also sell the
output at a higher price by incurring a storage cost) emerges in the end of production to
compete with the landlord as a potential buyer for the tenant’s share of output. Then the
question is, out of the multiple contracts obtained before, which ones will the landlord choose
when he anticipates such a possibility? We show that the unique contract that is robust to
this refinement criterion is a sharecropping contract. To see the intuition, observe that
incentive provision to the tenant demands that a relatively high share for the landlord has
to be compensated by a relatively high price at which the landlord offers to buy the tenant’s
share. The possibility of a third agent as another potential buyer enables the landlord to have
a high share of output for himself without incurring the loss of buying the tenant’s output at
high price. We show that competition in the product market generates a Pareto improving
subset of share contracts out of the multiple contracts obtained before. It is optimal for the
landlord to choose that specific contract in this subset where his own share is maximum.
The upshot is that the unique robust contract results in sharecropping where the tenant’s
share is high enough to ensure that the third agent trades with the tenant and just breaks
even.
While the specific aim of this paper is to provide a theoretical analysis of sharecropping,
the paper relates itself to some of the more general themes of development economics. Rural
economies of poor countries are subject to volatilities of different kinds such as in weather,
prices and wages that severely effect the people living there [see, e.g., Bliss and Stern (1982),
Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1993), Jayachandran (2006)].
It is also important to note that the effect of these volatilities are different across agents. In
their study of Indian villages for 1975-84, Rosenzweig and Binswanger (1993) find evidence
that facing possible income volatilities, wealthier households engaged in significantly more
risky production activities and on the average obtained a much higher return than poorer
households. Studying the effect of productivity shocks on agricultural workers using wage
data from India for 1956-87, Jayachandran (2006) finds support for her theoretical prediction
that such shocks cause higher wage fluctuations for poor workers that make them worse
off, but in contrast, rich landowners are better off since negative productivity shocks are
compensated by lower wages. Thus, our basic premise that landlords can take advantage of
price fluctuations while the tenant-farmers cannot, is part of a much broader phenomenon of
agrarian economies that shows that rich and poor agents respond differently to volatilities.
Our theoretical conclusion that tenancy contracts could be endogenous to the nature
of price fluctuations is consistent with the well observed aspect of rural economies that
institutions and contractual forms often emerge to cope with the volatilities mentioned above.
Specifically, various formal and informal rural insurance systems in this regard have been
extensively studied in a large literature [see, e.g., Platteau and Abraham (1987), Udry (1990),
Townsend (1994), Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), Munshi and Rosenzweig (2007)]. It
should be mentioned that interlinked contracts in our model play the role of implicitly
providing insurance to the tenant-farmer. When the landlord specifies a price to buy the
tenant’s share of output, the tenant is insured against two contingencies: (i) if the immediate
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post-harvest price is even lower than expected, he is assured of a higher price from the
landlord and (ii) the already standing offer from the landlord improves the tenant’s position
as a seller vis-a`-vis another potential buyer (e.g., a third agent of the kind described before).
The landlord needs to provide such insurance to make sure that the tenant’s incentive stays
at its optimal level. If there are other entities (e.g., the government or a big outside firm that
does not have a stake at small village-level competition) that can reliably assure the tenant
of a high price, the price differential between the two contracting parties will be reduced and
the resulting tenancy contracts will also evolve. This is similar in spirit to the conclusion
of Jayachandran (2006) who finds evidence that access to financial services such as banks
reduces wage fluctuations for agricultural workers.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present a few case studies to provide
support for our premise that landlords store output to take advantage of price variation. We
present the model and derive the optimal contracts in Section 3. The model with interlinked
contracts is studied in Section 4. We conclude in Section 5. Some proofs are relegated to
the Appendix.
2 Empirical evidence
The basic premise of our proposed theory is that landlords store the agricultural output
in order to take advantage of price fluctuations. A key question is whether we observe
landlords storing output. We provide some evidence on this from four studies to motivate
our theoretical analysis.
The first evidence is taken from Myers (1984) who studies four villages in north China
for the period 1890-1949. The village Ssu pei ch’ai, located at Luan-che’eng county, was
one of the villages covered in this study. Two main tenurial systems of this village were
shao-chung-ti (a form of share tenancy) and pao-chung-ti (a form of fixed rent). Cotton was
the main marketed crop and the large market located in the county seat of Luan-che’eng
was the major outlet for landlords and traders. The immediate post-harvest market there is
described as follows (ibid: 79):
“On the supply side, absentee landlords also sold cotton to the market, but their
percentage of total supply marketed was very small. They naturally preferred to sell
long after the harvest when cotton prices resumed their rise...Cotton prices were high
during the winter months and low during the summer period...landlords retained their
cotton and sold during the early spring...”
The source of the second evidence is Baker (1984) who studies three sub-regional economies
of the south Indian region of Tamilnad from 1880s to early 1950s. Landlords having custom-
ary rights in land were called mirasidars in this region. The mirasidars usually leased their
lands using a specific form of sharecropping called waram. The description of the paddy
market there makes it clear that not only did landlords store the produce, but also their
crop-sharing decision was influenced by such marketing activities:
“...[T]here was a distinct pattern to the annual marketing cycle...The first stage came
immediately after the main harvest in the months from January to April. This was
the time when cultivators had to pay their government revenue and service their debts.
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Many cultivators, particularly the smaller ones, were obliged to unload their produce
immediately. Perhaps half of the entire crop was sold at this point and naturally enough
the prices were low...Substantial mirasidars...would procure stocks of rice in order to
store against an expected price rise. They accumulated stocks through crop-shares
they received from waram tenants; the mirasidars who were really interested in the
market would have provided the seed and the cattle for the waram tenant in order that
they might take away a very substantial crop-share (p. 239)...in the final stage of the
marketing year...mirasidars...would release stocks on the eve of the next harvest when
prices reached their peak. (p. 241)”
The next evidence is from Bolivia. In the pre-land reform Bolivia during 1920-50, different
forms of land tenurial systems such as sharecropping and colonato (a kind of labor-rent
system) existed [see, e.g., Mendelberg (1965: 46), Jackson (1994: 162-163), Assies (2006:
580)]. In his study of pre-reform agriculture markets of the north highlands of Bolivia, Clark
(1968) finds that most landlords there were absentees, who lived in the city of La Paz that
was also the major marketing center of the highlands area. It is clearly documented that
landlords engaged in storing and marketing of the produce in a fairly organized manner:
“At the time of the harvest the landlord visited the firm to make sure that he received
the agricultural produce that was due him (p.157)...In the last seven to ten years before
1952 many landlords began to use their own or rented trucks to bring produce to La
Paz...Once in La Paz agricultural produce was stored and subsequently sold in the
store or aljer´ıa owned by the landlord...The person who worked in the store was called
an aljiri...The specific obligations of an aljiri were to go and tell the retailers in the city
markets who had done business with the landlord previously of the arrival of products
from the farm...If the buyer was interested the aljiri would call the landlord...to come
and make a sale...These sales were usually made in large quantities to established
retailers in the La Paz markets...when sales were difficult to make in large quantities
at a good price, the landlord would sell directly to consumers in small quantities (p.
158).”
The last evidence is taken from Sharma (1997) whose study is based on fieldworks of a
village in the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh, conducted in the early nineties. Sharecropping
was the dominant form of tenurial system in this village. It is reported that the rich landlords
there stored output to take advantage of price variation (ibid: 270-271):
“Two of the rich peasant households in the village each own a large diesel-operated
machine for wheat-threshing and winnowing and rice-shelling which enables them...to
process and bag much of their grains in the village (eliminating the middlemen and
the cost of transport to the mills), and to sell it directly to grain merchants in Aligarh
and Delhi for a much higher return. The imposing brick-made godown (grain-storage
barn) in the centre of the village...not only acts as a storage bin, but also allows the
rich land-owners periodically to withhold grain from the market until prices improve.”
The studies above show that price variation and the concomitant selling behavior of
landlords is an aspect that is commonly observed in agriculture. Given that, it is plausible
that it may play a role in determining tenurial institutions. It can be also noted that such
price variations can be seasonal as well as spatial in nature. Although our theoretical analysis
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will be presented in terms of seasonal variation of price, it will also apply for spatial variations
of the kind mentioned in some of these studies.
3 The model
Consider a small village consisting of one landlord and many potential tenants. The landlord
owns a piece of land that can grow only one crop. The landlord leases out his land to a tenant
to carry out production.
• The Production Process: There is only one input of production: labor (`). In the land
leased out by the landlord, the production function is f(`), where f(0) = 0. We assume that
f is twice continuously differentiable with f ′(`) > 0 and f ′′(`) < 0 for ` > 0, i.e., f is strictly
increasing and strictly concave. Moreover, lim`↓0 f ′(`) = ∞ and lim`→∞ f ′(`) = 0. The cost
of ` units of labor is w(`), where w(0) = 0. It is assumed that w is twice continuously
differentiable, strictly increasing and convex, i.e., w′(`) > 0 and w′′(`) ≥ 0 for ` > 0.
• Price Behavior: The market price of the product exhibits seasonal variation which
is modeled as follows. There are two seasons 1 and 2. Season 1 can be viewed as the
immediate post-harvest period when the price is p1 > 0. Season 2 corresponds to a future
period sometime after season 1 (but before the next harvest), when the price is p2 > p1.
We assume that these prices are determined by economy-wide demand-supply conditions.
The price is low in season 1 due to large aggregate supply immediately after the harvest. In
season 2 price rises due to a fall in the aggregate supply. We normalize p1 = 1 and denote
p2 ≡ p > 1.
The landlord can store any output q in season 1 and sell it later in season 2 at price p > 1
by incurring a storage cost c(q) that is strictly increasing and strictly convex.4 The tenant,
on the other hand, sells any output at his disposal in season 1 at price 1. There are two main
reasons behind this difference in the selling behavior of the two parties: (i) the landlord has
storage facilities that the tenant lacks and (ii) unlike the landlord, the tenant does not have
enough buffer wealth, so he has to sell his output in season 1 to pay for essential commodities
for immediate consumption. The passage cited from Baker (1984: 239) in the last section
provides empirical support to this. See also Myers (1984: 79-80).
We assume that the output held by any agent of the village is very small compared to the
aggregate supply. So in any season, an agent of the village can sell his output at the existing
market price of that season without affecting the price. This assumption seems reasonable
for season 1 as the aggregate supply immediately after the harvest is large. Regarding season
2, it can be seen from the empirical evidence given in the last section that landlords who
seek to take advantage of price fluctuations usually sell their produce in large town markets
(e.g., markets in the county seat of Luan-che’eng or in cities like La Paz or Aligarh). It is
assumed that although the aggregate supply falls in season 2, still it is very large in a town
market and a landlord, being a small player in such a market, does not affect the price.
• The Set of Contracts: The landlord can lease out his land to the tenant through two
different classes of contracts: (1) tenancy contracts and (2) crop-buying contracts. For both
classes, we restrict to linear contracts.
4See Section 3.2.1 for a detailed specification of the storage cost.
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A tenancy contract is a pair (α, β), where α ∈ [0, 1] is the share of the output of the
tenant and β ∈ R is the fixed lump-sum cash transfer from the tenant to the landlord. If the
tenant works under the contract (α, β) and produces output Q: (i) he keeps αQ and leaves
the rest (1−α)Q with the landlord and (ii) makes the lump-sum transfer β to the landlord.
We say that (α, β) is a share contract if the landlord and the tenant share the output, i.e., if
0 < α < 1. If 0 < α < 1 and β = 0, we have a pure share contract. If α = 1 and β > 0, the
resulting contract is a fixed rental contract, where the tenant keeps the entire output and
pays the fixed rent β to the landlord.
A crop-buying contract is a number γ > 0 where γ is the price at which the landlord
offers to buy the output produced by the tenant. If the tenant works under the crop-buying
contract γ and produces Q, he obtains γQ if he sells the output to the landlord. Since the
tenant can sell the output in season 1 at price 1, he will not sell it to the landlord if γ < 1.
On the other hand, since the landlord obtains the price p in season 2, he makes a loss if he
buys from the tenant at a price γ > p. Therefore we can restrict γ ∈ [1, p].
• The Strategic Interaction: The strategic interaction between the landlord and the tenant
is modeled as a game G in extensive form that has the following stags. In the first stage, the
landlord either offers a tenancy contract (α, β) or a crop-buying contract γ to the tenant. In
the second stage, the tenant either rejects the contract in which case the game terminates
with both parties get their reservation payoffs, or he accepts in which case the game moves
to the third stage where the tenant chooses the amount of labor for carrying out production
and output is realized. In the fourth stage, the tenant pays the landlord in accordance with
the contract. If the tenant works under a tenancy contract (α, β) and the output is Q: (i)
he keeps αQ which he sells in season 1 at price 1 and leaves the rest (1 − α)Q with the
landlord and (ii) makes the lump-sum cash transfer β to the landlord. If the tenant works
under a crop-buying contract γ and the output is Q, he sells it to the landlord at price γ. In
the fifth stage, the landlord, who can store the output at his disposal by incurring a storage
cost, decides on his storing strategy (i.e. how much to store for selling in season 2 and how
much to sell in season 1). Finally payoffs are realized and the game terminates. The solution
concept is the notion of Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE).
3.1 The tenant’s problem
We consider the tenant’s problem under two different classes of contracts.
• Tenancy contracts: Under a tenancy contract (α, β), the payoff of the tenant has two
components: (i) the profit that he obtains from his share α of the produced output and (ii)
the lump-sum transfer β that he has to make to the landlord. If the tenant chooses labor
input `, the output is f(`). When the tenant’s share of output is α, he keeps αf(`) which he
sells in season 1 at price 1, thus earning the revenue αf(`). As the cost of ` units of labor
is w(`), the tenant’s profit is αf(`)− w(`). So his payoff under the contract (α, β) when he
employs ` units of labor is
αf(`)− w(`)− β (1)
and β being a constant, his problem reduces to choosing ` to maximize αf(`)− w(`).
• Crop-buying contract: Under a crop-buying contract γ, the tenant sells the output to
the landlord at price γ. If the tenant chooses labor input `, the output is f(`). When the
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tenant sells this output at price γ, he obtains the revenue γf(`). The cost of ` units of labor
is w(`). Hence the tenant’s payoff under the contract γ when he employs ` units of labor is
γf(`)− w(`) (2)
and his problem is to choose ` to maximize γf(`)− w(`).
For x ≥ 0, let us define
φx(`) := xf(`)− w(`). (3)
Then by (1) and (2), it follows that: (i) under the tenancy contract (α, β), the tenant’s
problem is to maximize φα(`) and (ii) under the crop-buying contract γ, his problem is to
maximize φγ(`). So it will be useful to solve the problem of maximizing φx(`) for any x ≥ 0.
Since f ′′ < 0 and w′′ ≥ 0, by (3), φx(`) is strictly concave in ` for x > 0. For x ≥ 0, let
`(x) be the unique maximizer of φx(`). Clearly `(0) = 0. For x > 0, `(x) is obtained from
the first-order condition xf ′(`) = w′(`). Hence
`(0) = 0 and xf ′(`(x)) = w′(`(x)) for x > 0. (4)
Now define the composite functions F,Φ : R+ → R+ as
F (x) := f(`(x)) and Φ(x) := φx(`(x)) = xF (x)− w(`(x)). (5)
The following lemma, which characterizes the solution to the tenant’s problem under different
classes of contracts, follows from (1)-(5) and by the envelope theorem.
Lemma 1 (i) Under the tenancy contract (α, β), the tenant chooses labor input `(α), the
output produced is F (α) and the tenant obtains the payoff Φ(α)− β.
(ii) Under the crop-buying contract γ, the tenant chooses labor input `(γ), the output produced
is F (γ) and the tenant obtains the payoff Φ(γ).
(iii) `(0) = 0, F (0) = 0 and Φ(0) = 0.
(iv) `′(x) > 0, F ′(x) > 0 and Φ′(x) = F (x) > 0 for x > 0.
Having characterized the solution of the tenant’s problem under any contract offered by
the landlord, we are in a position to solve the landlord’s problem of determining his optimal
contracts. Before solving that problem, we qualify two more aspects of our model. First,
we impose more structure to the model by making an additional assumption and second,
we specify the reservation payoff of the tenant in terms of the function Φ(.) and provide the
economic interpretation behind this specification.
3.1.1 Assumption: Concavity of F (x)
Consider the function F (x) = f(`(x)). As F ′(x) = f ′(`(x))`′(x), we have
F ′′(x) = f ′′(`(x))[`′(x)]2 + f ′(`(x))`′′(x).
Since f ′′ < 0, the first term of the expression above is negative, but the sign of the second
term is ambiguous. We make the following additional assumption, which is a sufficient
condition to ensure that the landlord’s problem will have a unique solution.
Assumption A1: The functions f(`) and w(`) are such that F (x) is concave, i.e., F ′′(x) ≤ 0.
Assumption A1 holds for f(`) = `a and w(`) = k`b for k > 0, a < 1 ≤ b and a/b ≤ 1/2.
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3.1.2 Reservation payoff of the tenant
In specifying the reservation payoff of the tenant, we posit the following situation which is
plausible in a less developed village economy. We assume that a potential tenant is a small or
marginal farmer in the village who has limited employment opportunities outside. Moreover
such a farmer lacks the necessary storage facilities, which prevents him from taking advantage
of the seasonal variation of price. If he does not have a contract with the landlord, his only
viable alternative is to cultivate his own land, which is smaller and possibly of inferior quality
than the land leased out by the landlord and his alternative payoff is the profit from this
land when the output is sold at price 1 (the price of season 1). This profit, being a good
approximation of the opportunity cost of a potential tenant, is assumed to be the reservation
payoff of the tenant.
To formalize the situation described above, observe that if a farmer cultivates the land
leased out by the landlord without any contractual obligation and sells the output at price
1, under his optimal choice of labor, the profit that he obtains is Φ(1) (take α = 1, β = 0
in Lemma 1). So a small farmer, who cultivates a smaller and possibly inferior quality land
and sells his output at price 1, obtains Φ < Φ(1). We consider this profit Φ [0 < Φ < Φ(1)]
to be the reservation payoff of the tenant. Since Φ(0) = 0 and Φ(.) is strictly increasing
(Lemma 1), there is a constant α ∈ (0, 1) such that Φ = Φ(α). For the rest of the paper we
assume that the reservation payoff of the tenant is Φ(α) for a small positive fraction α.
3.2 The landlord’s problem
Observe that under any contract the landlord potentially has some output Q > 0 at his
disposal. To solve the landlord’s problem, first we determine his optimal storing strategy
for any Q > 0 and then obtain his payoff under any contract by using the revenue from his
optimal storing strategy.
3.2.1 Storage cost and optimal storing strategy
Let c(x) denote the landlord’s cost of storing output x. We assume that c(0) = 0, c(x) is
twice continuously differentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex, i.e., c′(x) > 0 and
c′′(x) > 0 for x > 0. We also assume that c′(0) = 0 and limx→∞ c′(x) = ∞. Under these
assumptions, for any p > 1, ∃ 0 < Qp <∞ such that
p− 1 T c′(x)⇔ x S Qp. (6)
Moreover
Qp is strictly increasing, Q1 = 0 and lim
p→∞
Qp =∞. (7)
As the price of the output is 1 in season 1 and p > 1 in season 2, the marginal revenue of the
landlord from storing across seasons is p− 1, so by (6), the marginal cost of storing exceeds
the marginal revenue p − 1 beyond Qp. Therefore storing is worthwhile for the landlord as
long as the amount stored does not exceed Qp.
Now suppose the landlord has output Q ∈ (0,∞) at his disposal (Q will depend on the
contract offered by the landlord and the output produced by the tenant). For any Q, a
typical storing strategy for the landlord is 〈Q−x, x〉 for x ∈ [0, Q], where (i) x is the amount
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he stores in season 1 and sells in season 2 and (ii) Q− x is the amount he sells in season 1.
Since the price in season 2 is p and the storage cost is c(x), the net revenue of the landlord
from storing x is R2(x) = px− c(x). For the remaining output Q− x, he obtains price 1 and
there is no cost of storing, so his revenue is R1(Q−x) = Q−x. Hence the landlord’s revenue
under the storing strategy 〈Q− x, x〉 is ψpQ(x) = R2(x) +R1(Q− x) = Q+ (p− 1)x− c(x).
Denoting
ζp(x) = (p− 1)x− c(x), (8)
we have
ψpQ(x) = Q+ ζ
p(x). (9)
By (8) and (9), for any Q, the problem of finding an optimal storing strategy reduces to
choosing x ∈ [0, Q] to maximize ζp(x). The following lemma characterizes the optimal storing
strategy of the landlord for any Q.
Lemma 2 (i) For x ≥ 0, ∂ζp(x)/∂x T 0⇔ x S Qp.
(ii) Let Q ∈ (0,∞). The unique maximum of ψpQ(x) over x ∈ [0, Q] is attained at x = Q
if Q < Qp and at x = Qp if Q ≥ Qp. Consequently when the landlord has output Q at his
disposal, his optimal storing strategy is 〈0, Q〉 if Q < Qp and 〈Q−Qp, Qp〉 if Q ≥ Qp.
(iii) The revenue of the landlord under his optimal storing strategy when he has output Q is
Ψp(Q) =
{
Q+ ζp(Q) = pQ− c (Q) if Q < Qp,
Q+ ζp(Qp) = Q+ (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)
if Q ≥ Qp.
(10)
(iv) Ψp(0) = 0, Ψp(Q) is strictly increasing in both Q and p, and limp→∞Ψp(Q) =∞.
(v) For any p > 1, Ψp(Q) is concave in Q. If Q1, Q2 ≥ 0 is such that (a) at least one of
Q1, Q2 is positive and (b) at least one of them is less than Qp, then
Ψp (λQ1 + (1− λ)Q2) > λΨp(Q1) + (1− λ)Ψp(Q2) for any λ ∈ (0, 1).
(vi) Let p > 1. For any Q1, Q2 > 0, Ψ
p(Q1 +Q2) < Ψ
p(Q1) + Ψ
p(Q2).
Proof. Parts (i)-(iii) follow by (6), (8) and (9). Part (iv) follows by (7) and (10).
For (v)-(vi), note that Ψp(Q) is continuous, but it has a kink at Q = Qp. The function
Ψp(Q) is presented in Figure 1, from which the results of (v)-(vi) are clear. The details of
the proof are left in the Appendix.
The optimal storing strategy given by the lemma above is fairly intuitive. Since the
marginal revenue from storing p− 1 falls below the marginal cost of storing once the output
exceeds Qp, it does not pay the landlord to store any output beyond Qp. Also observe that
the revenue Ψp(Q) under the optimal storing strategy exhibits decreasing returns to scale.
This result will be useful later in our analysis.
3.2.2 Tenancy contracts
Consider a tenancy contract (α, β) where α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ R. By Lemma 1, the tenant’s
optimal choice of labor under this contract is `(α) that yields the output F (α). As the
landlord’s share is (1−α), the output at his disposal is (1−α)F (α). Define H : [0, 1]→ R+
as
H(α) := (1− α)F (α). (11)
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Taking Q = H(α) in (10) of Lemma 2, the revenue of the landlord under his optimal storing
strategy is Ψp(H(α)). As the landlord also obtains the fixed rent β, his payoff is
Πp (α, β) = Ψp (H(α)) + β. (12)
By Lemma 1, when the tenant acts optimally under the contract (α, β), he obtains Φ(α)−β.
Since the reservation payoff of the tenant is Φ(α), the tenant will accept the contract (α, β)
only if
Φ(α)− β ≥ Φ(α). (13)
Under the class of tenancy contracts, the landlord’s problem is to choose (α, β) to maximize
(12) subject to (13). For any α, the optimal β for the landlord is
βα(α) = Φ(α)− Φ(α) (14)
that binds the tenant’s participation constraint (13). So it is sufficient to consider contracts
(α, βα(α)) for α ∈ [0, 1]. Under (α, βα(α)), the payoff of the landlord is
Πp,α (α) = Ψp(H(α)) + Φ(α)− Φ(α). (15)
Observe that for any α, the total surplus (sum of payoffs of the landlord and the tenant) is
Ψp(H(α)) + Φ(α).
Let us first consider the situation when there is no price variation across seasons (i.e.
p = 1). Then the landlord’s optimal storing strategy is to sell H(α) in season 1 at price 1 to
obtain the revenue Ψ1(H(α)) = H(α) and the total surplus is
s(α) = H(α) + Φ(α). (16)
The following lemma, which characterizes the basic properties of the functions H(α) and
s(α), will be useful for solving the landlord’s problem. The proof is standard and hence
omitted. Assumption A1 [concavity of F (.)] is used to prove the strict concavity of H(.).
Lemma 3 (i) H(0) = H(1) = 0.
(ii) H ′(α) = (1− α)F ′(α)− F (α) and H(α) is strictly concave for α ∈ [0, 1].
(iii) There is a constant α˜ ∈ (0, 1) such that H ′(α) T 0⇔ α S α˜.
(iv) s′(α) = (1 − α)F ′(α), s(α) is strictly increasing for α ∈ [0, 1] and s(1) > s(α) for
α ∈ [0, 1).
Before solving the landlord’s problem under general tenancy contracts, we recap the Mar-
shallian inefficiency argument against sharecropping and show how the Marshallian critique
loses some of its force in the presence of price variation (Proposition 1). This proposition
formalizes the basic intuition of this paper and forms the basis of the remaining results,
where properties of different contracts are derived in more detail.
3.2.3 The Marshallian inefficiency argument
To see the Marshallian inefficiency argument against sharecropping, we begin with fixed
rental contracts. A fixed rental contract is of the form (1, β), where the tenant keeps the
entire output (α = 1) and pays only a fixed rent β > 0 to the landlord. Under the contract
(1, β), the landlord has no output at his disposal [H(1) = 0] so his payoff is simply the fixed
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rent β. Taking α = 1 in (14), the optimal fixed rental contract for the landlord is (1, βα(1))
where
βα(1) = Φ(1)− Φ(α). (17)
Now let 0 < α < 1 and consider the share contract (α, βα(α)). Since Φ(.) is monotonic, by
(14) and (17), compared to the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1)), the share contract (α, βα(α))
entails a rental loss for the landlord. This loss is
βα(1)− βα(α) = Φ(1)− Φ(α) > 0. (18)
However, under the latter contract, the landlord has output H(α) > 0 at his disposal.
Therefore the share contract (α, βα(α)) can be superior to the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1))
for the landlord only if his revenue from output H(α) can recover the rental loss in (18).
Define A : (0, 1)→ R+ as
A(α) = [Φ(1)− Φ(α)]/H(α). (19)
The function A(α) presents the rental loss per unit of output when the landlord switches
from the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1)) to the share contract (α, βα(α)).
When there is no price variation across seasons (i.e. p = 1), a share contract always results
in a lower total surplus s(α) < s(1) [Lemma 3(iv)]. This is the essence of the Marshallian
inefficiency argument against sharecropping. This argument can be put in per unit terms as
follows. When p = 1, the landlord receives the same unit price for the output as the tenant.
So if he switches from the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1)) to the share contract (α, βα(α)),
it is never possible for him to recover the rental loss through his revenue from H(α). In the
presence of price variation (p > 1), however, the Marshallian inefficiency argument does not
have its unequivocal force. If the landlord can receive a higher price for the output H(α),
it may enable him to recover the rental loss. Proposition 1 makes this point precise, where
we show that for any p > 1, there is a share contract (α, βα(α)) such that the landlord’s
per unit profit (net of storage cost) from output H(α) is higher than the per unit rental loss
A(α) in (19).
Proposition 1 (i) A(α) > 1 for all α ∈ (0, 1) and limα↑1A(α) = 1.
(ii) (Marshallian Inefficiency of Share Contracts) When p = 1, the unique optimal tenancy
contract for the landlord is the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1)).
(iii) For any p > 1, there is a share contract that yields higher payoff to the landlord compared
to the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1)).
Proof. (i) Consider the function s(α) = H(α)+Φ(α) (the total surplus when p = 1) given in
(16). Since H(1) = 0, we have s(1) = Φ(1). By Lemma 3(iv), s(1) = Φ(1) > s(α) = H(α) +
Φ(α) for any α ∈ (0, 1). As H(α) > 0 for α ∈ (0, 1), we have A(α) = [Φ(1)−Φ(α)]/H(α) > 1
for α ∈ (0, 1).
As limα↑1[Φ(1)−Φ(α)] = 0 and limα↑1H(α) = H(1) = 0, by L’Hospital’s rule, limα↑1A(α)
= limα↑1[−Φ′(α)/H ′(α)]. Since Φ′(α) = F (α) (Lemma 1) and H ′(α) = (1− α)F ′(α)− F (α)
(Lemma 3), we have limα↑1A(α) = limα↑1 [F (α)/{F (α)− (1− α)F ′(α)}] = 1.
(ii) It is sufficient to consider contracts (α, βα(α)) for α ∈ [0, 1] where βα(α) is given by
(14). Clearly α = 0 is not optimal. For 0 < α < 1, the landlord incurs a per unit rental loss
A(α). When p = 1, the per unit profit of the landlord from output H(α) is 1. The proof is
complete by noting that A(α) > 1 [by part (i)].
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(iii) Let p > 1. Consider 0 < α < 1. Under the share contract (α, βα(α)), the landlord
gets output H(α) > 0. If he stores H(α) in season 1 and sells it in season 2 at price p > 1 (it
is a feasible storing strategy), his profit net of storage cost is pH(α) − c(H(α)). So his per
unit profit is
A
p
(α) = p− c(H(α))/H(α) > p− c′(H(α)),
the last inequality following by the strict convexity of c(.). Since c′(0) = 0 and H(1) = 0, we
have
lim
α↑1
A
p
(α) ≥ lim
α↑1
[p− c′(H(α))] = p > 1 = lim
α↑1
A(α).
So it is possible to choose α ∈ (0, 1) such that the per unit profit Ap(α) is more than the per
unit rental loss A(α). This completes the proof.
Remarks. The proposition above shows the optimality of share contracts under two implicit
assumptions: (i) the share contract has a rental component with it and (ii) the landlord has
full bargaining power over the tenant and he uses the rent to drive down the tenant’s payoff
to its reservation level. Now we discuss the plausibility of (i) and (ii) and see the extent to
which the result above is sensitive to these assumptions.
1. Bargaining power: A poor rural economy is usually labor-surplus in nature. As
the number of small or marginal farmers (who are potential tenants) in a village is large
compared to the number of landlords, in this context it is arguably natural to assume that
a landlord holds relatively large bargaining power over a tenant. We assume full bargaining
power for analytical convenience and our conclusions will continue to hold qualitatively under
situations where the landlord has less than full bargaining power, as long as it is not too
small. This is illustrated below with regard to Proposition 1.
When the tenant’s share is α, his profit is Φ(α). Recall that the tenant’s reservation payoff
is Φ(α) for a small α ∈ (0, 1). Consider the following alternative bargaining arrangement:
• The tenant rejects any contract that has α < α.
• For α ∈ [α, 1], the additional profit of the tenant over his reservation payoff βα(α) =
Φ(α)−Φ(α) is divided as follows: the landlord gets bβα(α) and the tenant gets (1− b)βα(α)
where b ∈ (0, 1) is a constant that presents the bargaining power of the landlord.
Under this arrangement it is sufficient to consider contracts (α, bβα(α)) for α ∈ [α, 1].
Then the optimal fixed rental contract for the landlord is (1, bβα(1)) that yields the rent
bβα(1). If he switches from this contract to a share contract (α, bβα(α)), his rent be-
comes bβα(α). So the rental loss is b[Φ(1) − Φ(α)], yielding a per unit rental loss b[Φ(1) −
Φ(α)]/H(α) = bA(α). By Proposition 1(i), limα↑1 bA(α) = b < 1 and the conclusion of
Proposition 1(iii) continues to hold.
2. Share contracts without rental component: Now consider pure share contracts (α, 0)
that have no rental component. When the landlord switches from the fixed rental contract
(1, βα(1)) to a share contract (α, 0), his rental loss is βα(1) = Φ(1)−Φ(α) and the unit rental
loss is [Φ(1) − Φ(α)]/H(α). Since there is a unique maximizer α˜ ∈ (0, 1) of H(α) (Lemma
3), the unit rental loss is at least [Φ(1)−Φ(α)]/H(α˜) which is more than 1 for small values
of α. As the landlord can obtain at most p for each unit he sells, the unit profit can recover
the rental loss only when p is relatively large (see Proposition 2). Thus our basic intuition
that price variation leads to share contracts still holds, but expectedly a weaker result is
obtained when the contract forms are restricted.
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Do share contracts observed in practice include side payments? The evidence is mixed.
For example, Forster (1957: 236) finds that me`tayage (sharecropping) contracts of 18th
century Toulose in France included substantial side payments:
“The sharecropper had to pay for the use of the farm animals as well as for the use of the
land. In 1728 Franc¸ois Caseneuve, a tenant of Astre de Blagnac, was obligated under
his contract for half the harvest, twenty four pairs of fowl, all the cartage necessary
to carry the farm produce to the Toulose market, and a pre´le`vement (supplementary
rent) of eighty setiers of wheat.”
Evidence of various implicit and explicit side payments can be found in sharecropping con-
tracts from mid-19th century south India (Reddy, 1996: 80-81) and early 20th century South
Carolina, United States (Taylor, 1943: 125-128) as well. However, sometimes it is also the
case, such as in 19th century north China (Myers, 1970: 93) and Bolivia in the 1920s (Jack-
son, 1994: 163), where the landlords are primarily interested in collecting the share of the
harvest and there is no significant side payment. It is plausible that including a side payment
in the share contract may involve some transaction cost. As pure share contracts are of some
independent interest, we analyze them in the next section.
3.2.4 Pure share contracts
Under pure share contracts the contracting parties share the output (0 < α < 1) without
any rental transfer (β = 0). Taking β = 0 in (12), the landlord’s payoff under the pure share
contract (α, 0) is
ΠpS (α) = Ψ
p(H(α)). (20)
Taking β = 0 in (13), the tenant’s participation constraint is Φ(α) ≥ Φ(α). By the mono-
tonicity of Φ(.), this constraint reduces to α ≥ α. So under pure share contracts, the land-
lord’s problem is to choose α ≥ α to maximize (20).
Under the contract (α, 0), the landlord has output H(α) at his disposal. If there is no
storage cost, he can sell H(α) in season 2 at price p to obtain the pH(α). As α˜ ∈ (0, 1) is
the unique maximizer of H(α) (Lemma 3), in the absence of any storage cost, (α˜, 0) is the
optimal unconstrained pure share contract and it will be the optimal pure share contact if
α˜ ≥ α. Henceforth we shall assume that the tenant’s reservation payoff Φ(α) is small enough
so that the following holds.
Assumption A2: 0 < α < α˜.
A2 is not a crucial assumption, but it helps to simplify our analysis as it renders the
tenant’s participation constraint to be non-binding. Moreover A2 is consistent with the
interpretation that the reservation payoff of the tenant is sufficiently small as a potential
tenant is a small or marginal farmer with limited employment opportunities outside the
village.
Proposition 2 Consider the set of all pure share contracts S = {(α, 0)|α ∈ (0, 1)}. For any
p ≥ 1, the landlord has a unique optimal pure share contract (α˜, 0) that does not depend on
p or the storage cost c(.). The optimal contract has the following properties, where p˜ > 1 is
a constant.
(i) The tenant obtains Φ(α˜) > Φ(α).
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(ii) The output produced is F (α˜). The output at the landlord’s disposal is H(α˜) which exceeds
Qp if and only if p < p˜.
(iii) The landlord obtains
ΠpS(α˜) = Ψ
p(H(α˜)) =
{
H(α˜) + (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)
if p ∈ [1, p˜],
pH(α˜)− c (H(α˜)) if p > p˜.
(iv) ΠpS(α˜) is strictly increasing in p. Specifically dΠ
p
S(α˜)/dp equals Qp if p ∈ [1, p˜] and
H(α˜) if p > p˜. Moreover limp→∞Π
p
S(α˜) =∞.
(v) For any 0 < α < α˜, ∃ pSR(α) > 1, which is strictly decreasing in α, such that
• for the landlord, the optimal pure share contract (α˜, 0) is superior to the optimal fixed
rental contract (1, βα(1)) if and only if p > pSR(α),
• if p > pSR(α), then both the landlord and the tenant prefer (α˜, 0) over (1, βα(1)).
Proof. By (20) the landlord’s problem under pure share contracts is to choose α ∈ (0, 1)
to maximize Ψp(H(α)) subject to α ≥ α. Since Ψp(.) is monotonic (Lemma 2) and α˜ is the
unique maximizer ofH(α), α˜ is the unique maximizer of Ψp(H(α)). Since α˜ > α (Assumption
A2), (α˜, 0) is the unique optimal pure share contract. Part (i) is direct. Now we prove (ii)-(v).
(ii) Since Qp is monotonic, H(α˜) > 0 = Q1 and limp→∞Qp = ∞, ∃ p˜ > 1 such that
Qp S H(α˜)⇔ p S p˜.
(iii) Follows directly by taking Q = H(α˜) at (10) of Lemma 2.
(iv) Noting that p− 1 = c′(Qp), (iv) follows directly from (iii).
(v) The landlord obtains βα(1) = Φ(1) − Φ(α) under (1, βα(1)). Let ∆α(p) := ΠpS(α˜) −
βα(1). For the landlord (α˜, 0) is superior to (1, βα(1)) if and only if ∆α(p) > 0. The mono-
tonicity and limiting properties of ΠpS(α˜) yield (a) ∆
α(p) is strictly increasing in p and
(b) limp→∞∆α(p) = ∞. Since (1, βα(1)) is the unique optimal tenancy contract for p = 1
(Proposition 1), ∆α(1) < 0. Hence ∃ pSR(α) > 1 such that ∆α(p) S 0⇔ p S pSR(α), proving
the first statement of (v). The last statement is direct.
Under pure share contracts, the landlord’s only consideration is to keep the maximum
possible output at his disposal so that his revenue from price variation is maximum. For
any α, he has output H(α) and he chooses α = α˜ that maximizes H(α). Compared to the
optimal fixed rental contract, the pure share contract (α˜, 0) entails a rental loss Φ(1)−Φ(α˜)
which can be recovered from his revenue from H(α˜) provided the price p he receives is high
enough. Finally observe that it is possible that both the landlord and the tenant prefer the
pure share contract over the fixed rental contract, which shows that share contracts can be
optimal under alternative bargaining arrangements as well.
3.2.5 Tenancy contracts that include both share and rent
Now we consider general tenancy contracts (α, β) where α ∈ [0, 1] and β ∈ R. We know that
it is sufficient to consider contracts (α, βα(α)) where βα(α) = Φ(α) − Φ(α). By (15), the
payoff of the landlord under (α, βα(α)) is
Πp,αS+R (α) = Ψ
p(H(α)) + Φ(α)− Φ(α). (21)
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Taking Q = H(α) in (10) of Lemma 2 and noting that s(α) = H(α) + Φ(α), we can write
Πp,αS+R (α) =
{
s(α) + (p− 1)H(α)− c (H(α))− Φ(α) if H(α) < Qp,
s(α) + (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)− Φ(α) if H(α) ≥ Qp. (22)
To see the interpretation of the payoff above, let us consider the case when there is no price
variation (p = 1). Then the surplus generated under share α is s(α), the tenant is paid his
reservation payoff Φ(α) and the landlord obtains s(α) − Φ(α). For p > 1, the additional
terms in (22) represent the additional surplus that the landlord obtains from his output
H(α) due to price variation. If H(α) < Qp, he obtains an additional unit revenue of p − 1
while his cost of storage is c(H(α)) yielding the additional surplus (p− 1)H(α)− c (H(α)) .
If H(α) ≥ Qp, however, he obtains an additional unit revenue of p − 1 only for output Qp.
The remaining output H(α)−Qp is sold at price 1, so it yields no additional surplus. Hence
the additional surplus is (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)
.
Observe that (i) Πp,αS+R(α) is continuous at all α and (ii) it is twice continuously differen-
tiable at all α except when H(α) = Qp. The following lemma will be useful to determine the
optimal tenancy contracts.
Lemma 4 Let p > 1 and α˜ ∈ (0, 1) be the unique maximizer of H(α).
(i) Πp,αS+R (α) is strictly increasing for α ∈ [0, α˜).
(ii) If H(α) > Qp, then Π
p,α
S+R (α) is strictly increasing in α.
(iii) If H(α) < Qp, then Π
′ p
S+R(α) = (1− α)F ′(α) + [p− 1− c′(H(α))]H ′(α) and Πp,αS+R (α)
is strictly concave in α.
(iv) Suppose H(α˜) > Qp. Then ∃ αp ∈ (α˜, 1) such that for α ∈ [α˜, 1], H(α) T Qp ⇔ α S αp.
Consequently Πp,αS+R (α) is strictly increasing for α ∈ [α˜, αp).
(v) Πp,αS+R (α) is strictly decreasing at α = 1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Now we characterize the optimal tenancy contracts.
Proposition 3 Consider the set T = {(α, β)|α ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ R} of all tenancy contracts. For
any p > 1, the landlord has a unique optimal tenancy contract (α∗p, β
α(α∗p)). It is a share
contract (0 < α∗p < 1) where β
α(α∗p) = Φ(α
∗
p) − Φ(α) that binds the tenant’s participation
constraint. The optimal contract has the following properties.
(i)The output produced is F (α∗p). The output at the landlord’s disposal is H(α
∗
p) < Qp.
(ii) The landlord obtains Πp,αS+R(α
∗
p) = pH(α
∗
p)− c(H(α∗p)) + Φ(α∗p)− Φ(α).
(iii) Πp,αS+R(α
∗
p) is strictly increasing in p, ∂Π
p,α
S+R(α
∗
p)/∂p = H(α
∗
p) and limp→∞ Π
p,α
S+R(α
∗
p) =
∞.
(iv) α∗p > α˜ for all p > 1, i.e., the tenant’s share is higher than the share he gets under the
optimal pure share contract.
(v) α∗p is strictly decreasing, i.e., as price variation increases, the contract prescribes lower
share to the tenant and higher share to the landlord.
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(vi) limp→∞α∗p = α˜ (as price variation increases indefinitely, the tenant’s share converges
to his share under the optimal pure share contract) and limp↓1α∗p = 1 (as price variation
diminishes, the tenant’s share converges to 1).
Proof. Let MpS+R be the set of all maximizers of Π
p,α
S+R(α) over α ∈ [0, 1]. By Lemma
4(i), MpS+R ⊆ [α˜, 1]. If H(α˜) > Qp, then by Lemma 4(iv), MpS+R ⊆ [αp, 1] ⊂ [α˜, 1] where
αp ∈ (α˜, 1) is such that H(αp) = Qp. Let us define
α̂p =
{
αp if H(α˜) > Qp = H(αp),
α˜ if H(α˜) ≤ Qp.
(23)
Using (23), by Lemma 4 [(i) & (iv)], MpS+R ⊆ [α̂p, 1]. Let α ∈ (α̂p, 1]. Then by (23), H(α) <
Qp and Lemma 4(iii) yields Π
p,α
S+R(α) is strictly concave in α and
Π′ pS+R(α) = [p− 1− c′(H(α))]H ′(α) + (1− α)F ′(α) for α ∈ (α̂p, 1]. (24)
Observe by (23) that (a) if H(α˜) > Qp, then H(α̂p) = H(αp) = Qp and p− 1− c′(H(α̂p)) =
p− 1− c′(Qp) = 0 and (b) if H(α˜) ≤ Qp, then H ′(α̂p) = H ′(α˜) = 0. Thus, in either case the
first term of (24) is zero at α = α̂p and the right derivative of Π
p,α
S+R(α) at α = α̂p is
Π
′ p
S+R(α̂p) = lim
α↓α̂p
Π′ pS+R(α) = (1− α̂p)F ′(α̂p) > 0.
Hence Πp,αS+R(α) is strictly increasing in the neighborhood of α = α̂p. Since it is strictly
decreasing at α = 1 [Lemma 4(v)], ∃ a unique α∗p ∈ (α̂p, 1) such that Π′ pS+R(α∗p) = 0 and
α∗p is the unique maximizer of Π
p,α
S+R(α), proving that the optimal tenancy contract for the
landlord is a share contract. Now we prove properties (i)-(vi).
(i) As H(α) < Qp for α ∈ (α̂p, 1] and α∗p ∈ (α̂p, 1), (i) follows.
(ii) Using (i), (ii) follows by the first expression of (22).
(iii) The first part follows by the envelope theorem. Since limp→∞Π
p
S(α˜) =∞ (Proposi-
tion 2) and ΠpS+R(α
∗
p) ≥ ΠpS(α˜), the limiting property follows.
(iv) Since α∗p ∈ (α̂p, 1) and α̂p ≥ α˜ [by (23)], (iv) follows.
(v) Let 1 < p1 < p2. Since Π
′ p
S+R(α
∗
p) = 0 for any p > 1, by (24), Π
′ p2
S+R(α
∗
p1
) =
(p2 − p1)H ′(α∗p1). Since H ′(α) < 0 for α > α˜ (Lemma 3) and α∗p1 > α˜, we have Π′ p2S+R(α∗p1) <
0 = Π′ p2S+R(α
∗
p2
). The strict concavity of Πp,αS+R(α) then yields α
∗
p2
< α∗p1 .
(vi) Since limp→∞Qp = ∞, for large values of p, H(α) ≤ H(α˜) < Qp for all α ∈ [α˜, 1].
Now consider any small δ > 0 and let α ∈ [α˜ + δ, 1]. Since H ′(α) < 0 for α > α˜ and c′(.),
H ′(.) and F ′(.) are all bounded, from (24) it follows that ∃ P (δ) > 1 such that for any
p > P (δ), Π′ pS+R(α) < 0 for all α ∈ [α˜ + δ, 1]. Hence α∗p ∈ (α˜, α˜ + δ) for p > P (δ), proving
that limp→∞ α∗p = α˜.
When p = 1, the optimal tenancy contract is the fixed rental contract (1, βα(1)), i.e.,
α∗1 = 1 (Proposition 1). Hence limp↓1 α
∗
p = 1.
Proposition 3 qualifies the result of Proposition 1 by showing that under price variation,
the unique optimal tenancy contract is a sharecropping contract. One interesting result is
that the tenant’s share under the optimal pure share contract α˜ forms a lower bound of his
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share from the optimal tenancy contract. To see the intuition, observe from (21) that the
landlord’s payoff has two components: (i) Ψp(H(α)) (landlord’s revenue from output H(α)
under his optimal storing strategy) and (ii) Φ(α)−Φ(α) (the rent). The rent is increasing in
α. If α < α˜, H(α) is also increasing, resulting both components of the payoff to move in the
same direction. The landlord is then better off raising the tenant’s share until it reaches α˜.
When α ≥ α˜, there is a trade-off: H(α) then starts falling, so a higher rent can be obtained
only at the cost of a lower revenue Ψp(H(α)). This trade-off is settled by the extent of
price variation. As p increases, the revenue Ψp(H(α)) has a relatively higher weight in the
landlord’s payoff and he chooses a relatively small value of α that raises H(α). In the two
extremes, the tenancy contract converges to two “pure” contractual forms: towards a pure
share contract for large values of p and a fixed rental contract when p is close to 1.
3.2.6 Crop-buying contracts
Now we consider crop-buying contracts. Such a contract given by a number γ ∈ [1, p], where
γ is the unit price at which the landlord offers to buy the entire produced output from the
tenant. By Lemma 1, under the contract γ, the tenant’s optimal choice of labor is `(γ), the
output is F (γ) and the tenant’s payoff is Φ(γ). So the tenant’s participation constraint is
Φ(γ) ≥ Φ(α). Since α ∈ (0, 1), by the monotonicity of Φ(.) (Lemma 1), the participation
constraint of the tenant does not bind for any γ ≥ 1. Under the crop-buying contract γ,
the output at the landlord’s disposal is F (γ). Taking Q = F (γ) in Lemma 2, the landlord’s
revenue from this output under his optimal storing strategy is Ψp(F (γ)). Since the landlord
has to pay the tenant the price γ for each unit, his payoff is
ΠpB (γ) = Ψ
p(F (γ))− γF (γ). (25)
The landlord’s problem is to choose γ ∈ [1, p] to maximize ΠpB (γ) . Taking Q = F (γ) in (10)
of Lemma 2, by (25) we have
ΠpB (γ) =
{
(p− γ)F (γ)− c (F (γ)) if F (γ) < Qp
(1− γ)F (γ) + (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)
if F (γ) ≥ Qp
(26)
Note that ΠpB(γ) is continuous at all γ and it is twice continuously differentiable at all γ
except when F (γ) = Qp. The following lemma will be useful to determine the optimal crop
buying contracts.
Lemma 5 (i) If F (γ) > Qp, then Π
p
B(γ) is strictly decreasing in γ.
(ii) If F (1) ≥ Qp, then the unique maximizer of ΠpB(γ) over γ ∈ [1, p] is γ∗p = 1.
(iii) If F (1) < Qp < F (p), then ∃ γp ∈ (1, p) such that for γ ∈ [1, p], F (γ) S Qp ⇔ γ S γp.
Consequently ΠpB(γ) is strictly decreasing for γ ∈ (γp, p].
Proof. (i) If F (γ) > Qp, then by (26), Π
p
B(γ) = (1− γ)F (γ) + a constant. Hence Π′ pB (γ) =
(1− γ)F ′(γ)− F (γ) < 0 [since F (.) > 0, F ′(.) > 0 and γ ≥ 1] which proves the result.
(ii) If F (1) ≥ Qp, then by the monotonicity of F (.), F (γ) > Qp for all γ ∈ (1, p] and (ii)
follows by (i).
(iii) The first part of (iii) follows by the monotonicity of F (.). The second part follows
by (i).
Now we characterize the optimal crop-buying contracts.
19
Proposition 4 Consider the set of all crop-buying contracts B = {γ|γ ∈ [1, p]}. For any
p ≥ 1, the landlord has a unique optimal crop-buying contract γ∗p . The optimal contract has
the following properties, where p ≡ 1 + c′(F (1)) and p ≡ p+ F (1)/F ′(1).
(i) γ∗p = 1 if p ∈ [1, p] and γ∗p > 1 if p > p.
(ii) The tenant obtains Φ(1) if p ∈ [1, p] and Φ(γ∗p) > Φ(1) if p > p.
(iii) The landlord has the entire output F (γ∗p) at his disposal. It exceeds Qp if and only if
p < p.
(iv) The landlord obtains
ΠpB(γ
∗
p) =
 (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)
if p ∈ [1, p],
(p− 1)F (1)− c (F (1)) if p ∈ (p, p],
(p− γ∗p)F (γ∗p)− c
(
F (γ∗p)
)
if p > p.
(v) ΠpB(γ
∗
p) is strictly increasing in p. Specifically dΠ
p
B(γ
∗
p)/dp equals Qp if p ∈ [1, p], F (1)
if p ∈ (p, p] and F (γ∗p) if p > p. Moreover limp→∞ΠpB(γ∗p) =∞.
(vi) γ∗p is strictly increasing for p > p and γ
∗
p →∞ as p→∞.
Proof. The proof depends on whether F (1) exceeds Qp or not. Recall by (6) that F (1) S
Qp ⇔ p− 1 T c′(F (1)). As p ≡ 1 + c′(F (1)), F (1) S Qp ⇔ p T p.
Case 1. p ∈ [1, p]. Then F (1) ≥ Qp and by Lemma 5(ii), the unique maximizer of ΠpB(γ) is
γ∗p = 1.
Case 2. p > p. Then F (1) < Qp. Let M
p
B be the set of all maximizers of Π
p
B(γ) over
γ ∈ [1, p]. If F (1) < Qp < F (p) then by Lemma 5(iii), MpB ⊆ [1, γp] where F (γp) = Qp. Let
us define
γ̂p =
{
γp if F (1) < Qp = F (γp) < F (p),
p if F (p) ≤ Qp.
(27)
By (27) and Lemma 5(iii), MpB ⊆ [1, γ̂p]. Consider γ ∈ [1, γ̂p). Then F (γ) < Qp and ΠpB(γ)
is given by the first expression of (26). Denoting g(γ) := γ + c′(F (γ)), we have
Π′ pB (γ) = [p− g(γ)]F ′(γ)− F (γ) for γ ∈ [1, γ̂p). (28)
By (28), Π′ pB (γ) < 0 if p − g(γ) ≤ 0 [since both F ′(.) and F (.) are positive]. To determine
the sign of p − g(γ), observe that g(γ) is strictly increasing [g′(γ) = 1 + c′′(F (γ))F ′(γ) > 0
since c′′(.) > 0 and F ′(.) > 0]. Since c′(Qp) = p− 1, by (27) we have
g(γ̂p) =
{
γp + c
′(F (γp)) = γp + p− 1 if F (1) < Qp = F (γp) < F (p),
p+ c′(F (p)) if F (p) ≤ Qp.
Hence g(γ̂p) > p. As g(1) = 1 + c
′(F (1)) ≡ p < p, ∃ γ˜p ∈ (1, γ̂p) such that p − g(γ) T 0 ⇔
γ S γ˜p. So by (28), Π′ pB (γ) < 0 for γ ∈ [γ˜p, γ̂p), implying that MpB ⊆ [1, γ˜p]. Note from (28)
that
Π′′ pB (γ) = [p− g(γ)]F ′′(γ)− g′(γ)F ′(γ)− F ′(γ).
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Since p − g(γ) ≥ 0 for γ ∈ [1, γ˜p], F ′′(.) ≤ 0 (Assumption A1), g′(.) > 0 and F ′(.) > 0, it
follows that ΠpB(γ) is strictly concave for γ ∈ [1, γ˜p]. As Π′ pB (γ˜p) < 0, ΠpB(γ) has a unique
maximizer γ∗p ∈ [1, γ˜p). Whether γ∗p > 1 or γ∗p = 1 depends on Π′ pB (1). As g(1) = p, by (28),
Π′ pB (1) = [p − p]F ′(1) − F (1). Denoting p ≡ p + F (1)/F ′(1), Π′ pB (1) T 0 ⇔ p T p. So we
conclude that (a) if p ∈ (p, p], then γ∗p = 1 and (b) if p > p, then γ∗p ∈ (1, γ˜p) satisfying
Π′ pB (γ
∗
p) = 0.
Combining (a) and (b) with Case 1, it follows that the landlord has a unique crop-buying
contract γ∗p where γ
∗
p = 1 if p ∈ [1, p] and γ∗p > 1 if p > p. This proves (i). Part (ii) is direct
from (i). Now we prove properties (iii)-(v).
(iii) Follows by noting that (a) γ∗p = 1 and F (1) ≥ Qp for p ∈ [1, p], (b) γ∗p = 1 and
F (1) < Qp for p ∈ (p, p], and (c) F (γ∗p) < Qp for p > p.
(iv) Follows by (iii) and (26).
(v) The first part follows from (iv) by the envelope theorem and noting that p − 1 =
c′(Qp). To prove the limiting property, let p > p. Then F (1) < Qp and by (26), Π
p
B(1) =
(p− 1)F (1)− c(F (1)), so limp→∞ΠpB(1) =∞. Since ΠpB(γ∗p) ≥ ΠpB(1), the result follows.
(vi) Let p < p1 < p2. Then γ˜p1 < γ˜p2 [since g(.) is monotonic]. As γ
∗
p ∈ (1, γ˜p) for p > p,
both γ∗p1 , γ
∗
p2
∈ (1, γ˜p2). Since Π′ pB (γ∗p) = 0 for p > p, by (28), Π′ p2B (γ∗p1) = (p2−p1)F ′(γ∗p1) > 0.
The strict concavity of Πp2B (γ) over γ ∈ [1, γ˜p2 ] yields γ∗p2 > γ∗p1 proving the monotonicity of
γ∗p for p > p.
Consider any K > 1. For sufficiently large values of p, K < γ̂p. Then for γ ∈ [1, K],
Π′ pB (γ) is given by (28). As g(.), F
′(.), and F (.) are all bounded for γ ∈ [1, K], by (28)
Π′ pB (γ) > 0 for sufficiently large values of p. So for any K > 1, γ
∗
p > K for all sufficiently
large values of p proving that limp→∞ γ∗p =∞.
Crop-buying contracts are high-incentive in nature. Since the tenant sells the entire
output to the landlord at a high price, the output produced is high. For the landlord, the
marginal cost of storing goes up with higher volumes of output, so if p is small and he
has a large amount, his optimal storing strategy involves disposing off substantial part of
the output in season 1 at low price 1. Setting a high γ in the crop-buying contract is not
worthwhile for the landlord for small values of p, because for a substantial part of the output
he makes a net loss (pays price γ > 1 but sells at price 1). This is the reason why for small
values of p, the landlord buys the output at the minimum possible price 1. As p goes up,
it becomes more profitable for the landlord to have a higher output at his disposal. As a
result, he raises γ to create higher incentive for the tenant.
3.3 Comparison of different contracts
Now we are in a position to compare different contracts. To simplify notations, the optimal
contract for the landlord within each class is denoted as follows: R ≡ (1, βα(1)) (fixed rental
contract), S ≡ (α˜, 0) (pure share contract), S + R ≡ (α∗p, βα(α∗p)) (tenancy contract) and
B ≡ γ∗p (crop-buying contract). Also we use  to stand for the preference of the landlord
between two contracts (i.e. R  S means the landlord prefers R to S etc.).
Proposition 5 (1) The output produced is F (α˜) under S, F (α∗p) > F (α˜) under S + R,
F (1) > F (α∗p) under R and F (γ
∗
p) ≥ F (1) under B.
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(2) The tenant obtains his reservation payoff Φ(α) under R and S + R; he obtains Φ(α˜) >
Φ(α) under S and Φ(γ∗p) ≥ Φ(1) > Φ(α˜) under B.
(3) There are numbers pBS+R(α), p
B
R(α), p
S
R(α) > 1, all strictly decreasing in α, and a constant
pBS > 1 such that for the landlord:
(i) R  S if and only if p ≤ pSR(α).
(ii) S +R  B if and only if p ≤ pBS+R(α).
(iii) R  B if and only if p ≤ pBR(α).
(iv) S  B if and only if p ≤ pBS .
(4) Min{pBS , pSR(α)} ≤ pBR(α) ≤Max{pBS , pSR(α)}.
(5) If the landlord is restricted to only fixed rental, pure share and crop buying contracts,
then the following hold.
(i) Suppose pBS ≤ pSR(α). The optimal contract is R if p ≤ pBR(α) and it is B if p > pBR(α).
(ii) Suppose pBS > p
S
R(α). The optimal contract is R if p ≤ pSR(α), it is S if pSR(α) < p < pBS
and it is B if p ≥ pBS .
Proof. (1)-(2) follow directly from Propositions 1-4. Part (3)(i) has been proved in Propo-
sition 2.
(3)(ii) Let ∆αS+R(p) := Π
p
B(γ
∗
p) − Πp,αS+R(α∗p). We prove the first part by showing that
∆αS+R(p) is (a) negative when p = 1, (b) strictly increasing in p and (c) positive for large
values of p. By Prop. 4(iv), Π1B(γ
∗
1) = Π
1
B(1) = 0, proving (a). Since H(α
∗
p) < Qp and
H(α∗p) < F (1) ≤ F (γ∗p), by Props. 3(iii) and 4(iii), ∂∆αS+R(p)/∂p > 0 for all p ≥ 1 which
proves (b). To prove (c), observe that ΠpB(γ
∗
p) ≥ ΠpB(1). As F (1) < Qp for large values of p
(since limp→∞Qp =∞), by (26), ΠpB(γ∗p) ≥ ΠpB(1) = (p− 1)F (1)− c(F (1)). As Πp,αS+R(α∗p) ≤
pH(α∗p) + Φ(α
∗
p) [by Prop. 2(ii)], for large values of p
∆αS+R(p) ≥ p[F (1)−H(α∗p)]− Φ(α∗p)− F (1)− c(F (1)).
Since limp→∞ α∗p = α˜ and H(α˜) < F (1), it follows that limp→∞∆
α
S+R(p) = ∞ which proves
(c).
(3)(iii) Let ∆αR(p) := Π
p
B(γ
∗
p) − βα(1). By the monotonicity and limiting properties of
ΠpB(γ
∗
p) (Proposition 4), ∆
α
R(p) is strictly increasing in p and limp→∞∆
α
R(p) =∞. The proof
is complete by noting that ∆αR(1) = −βα(1) < 0 [since Π1B(γ∗1) = Π1B(1) = 0].
(3)(iv) Let ∆S(p) := Π
p
B(γ
∗
p) − ΠpS(α˜). Consider the constants p˜ (Proposition 2) and p
(Proposition 4). As Q(p˜) = H(α˜) < F (1) = Q(p), by the monotonicity of Q(.) we have
p˜ < p. The result is proved by showing that ∆S(p) is (a) a negative constant for p ∈ [1, p˜],
(b) strictly increasing for p > p˜ and (c) positive for large values of p. For p ∈ [1, p˜], by
Props. 2(ii) and 4(iv), ∆S(p) = −H(α˜) which proves (a). Since H(α˜) < Q(p) for p > p˜
and F (γ∗p) ≥ F (1) > H(α˜), by Props. 2(iii) and 4(iii), d∆S(p)/dp > 0 for p > p˜, proving
(b). Since ∆S(p) ≥ ∆αS+R(p) and limp→∞∆S+R(p) =∞, we have limp→∞∆S(p) =∞ which
proves (c).
For the proof of (4)-(5), we ignore non-generic values of p where the landlord is indifferent
between multiple contracts.
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(4) By contradiction, if the result is not true, then either (a) pBR(α) < min{pBS , pSR(α)} or
(b) pBR(α) > max{pBS , pSR(α)}. If (a) holds, then ∃ p such that pBR(α) < p < min{pBS , pSR(α)}.
By (3)(i), (iii) and (iv), for such a p, we have B  R, R  S and S  B, a contradiction.
If (b) holds, then ∃ p such that max{pBS , pSR(α)} < p < pBR(α). By (3)(i), (iii) and (iv), for
such a p, we have B  S, S  R and R  B, again a contradiction.
(5)(i) Suppose pBS ≤ pSR(α). Then by (4), pBS ≤ pBR(α) ≤ pSR(α). If p < pBR(α) ≤ pSR(α),
then R  B and R  S, proving that R is optimal. If p > pBR(α) ≥ pBS , then B  R and
B  S which proves that B is optimal.
(5)(ii) Suppose pBS > p
S
R(α). Then by (4), p
S
R(α) < p
B
R(α) < p
B
S . If p < p
S
R(α) < p
B
R(α),
then R  S and R  B proving that R is optimal. If pSR(α) < p < pBS , then S  R and
S  B which proves that S is optimal. If p > pBS > pBR(α), then B  S and B  R proving
that B is optimal. This completes the proof.
Proposition 5 shows that the landlord prefers crop-buying contracts over share contracts
only if the price variation is relatively large. A crop-buying contract results in higher output,
but the landlord has to pay the tenant a high unit price for this output that lowers the unit
profit margin. Under a share contract, the landlord keeps a share of relatively low output
[bounded by F (1)], but he does not have to pay for his share. A higher volume of output
with a lower unit profit margin is worthwhile only if p is large, which explains the result.
Pure share contracts dominate fixed rentals for relatively large values of p, while they
dominate crop-buying contracts when p is relatively small. The last part of Proposition
5 shows that depending on the specifics of the model, it is possible to have a range of
intermediate values of p where pure share contracts can be superior to both of these other
forms. We provide an example to show that the set of parameter values where the pure share
contract is optimal is not vacuous.
An Example: Let f(`) = `1/3 (production function), w(`) = ` (cost of labor) and c(q) =
q2/2 (storage cost). Since p− 1 = c′(Qp), for this example, Qp = p− 1.
For this example, `(x) = x
√
x/3
√
3, F (x) =
√
x/3, Φ(x) = 2x
√
x/3
√
3 and α˜ = 1/3. It
can be shown that [1.7, 2] ⊂ (p, p) (p and p are constants defined in Prop 4). If p ∈ [1.7, 2]
then (i) H(α˜) < Qp and Π
p
S(α˜) = 2p/9 − 2/81, (ii) ΠpB(γ∗p) = (p − 1)/
√
3 − 1/6 and (iii)
βα(1) = 2[1 − α√α]/3√3. If p ∈ [1.7, 2] and α ∈ [1/5, 1/3] then for the landlord the pure
share contract (1/3, 0) dominates both fixed rental and crop-buying contracts.
Take p = 1.8, α = 1/4. Then ΠpS(α˜) ≈ 0.375, ΠpB(γ∗p) ≈ 0.295 and βα(1) ≈ 0.336.
3.4 Some implications of the results
Our results show that as long as the gain from price variation is not sufficiently large, tenancy
contracts will be active. This is fairly consistent with what is observed in rural economies
where purely trade-based contracts are not frequently used. The landlord might also prefer
a share contract if he foresees the possibility of other competing buyers who may trade with
the tenant—this rationale for sharecropping is developed later in the paper.
One issue of share contracts that has received much attention in the literature is that
crop-sharing patterns do not show much variation within a region. For example, Rudra and
Bardhan (1983: 38) find that most villages in their survey had one or two sharing patterns.
In this regard, Stiglitz (1989: 22) points out:
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“...[T]he range of contract forms seems far more restricted than theory would suggest:
most contracts have, for instance, shares of one-half, one-third, or two-thirds. Although
there have been several attempts to explain this uniformity, none has gained general
acceptance.”
Further, there is a lack of explanation of “...why minute changes in the determining factors
do not bring about minute changes in the share proportion.” (Rudra, 1992: 288). Our results
provide a somewhat partial explanation of the uniformity of share contracts. Observe from
the last part of Proposition 5 that when general tenancy contracts are not allowed, there
could be an interval of values of p where the pure share contract (α˜, 0) is optimal for the
landlord. As the share α˜ does not depend on p, for relatively small changes in p within
an interval, the share contract will continue to stay optimal and the sharing pattern will
also remain the same. In other words, “minute changes” in price variation will not change
the share. However, this only explains that the specific share contract offered by a single
landlord may be relatively stable over time. As the share α˜ depends on the agent-specific
aspects (production function, labor cost), our results cannot explain uniformity of contract
forms if these aspects vary a lot within a region.
Observe that the price thresholds obtained in Proposition 5 depend on production and
storage cost functions of the landlord. If two landlords are relatively asymmetric, it is possible
that they might prefer to offer different types of contracts. For example, for the same p, a
landlord with a low storage cost may choose sharecropping while a landlord with a higher
cost of storage may offer a fixed rental contract. Thus, our results suggest that tenancy
contracts in a region may vary across agents depending on agent-specific characteristics.
This is similar in spirit to the conclusion of the screening models of sharecropping [e.g.,
Newbery and Stiglitz (1979), Hallagan (1982), Allen (1982), Muthoo (1998)] that argue that
tenants of different skills may be offered types of contracts. Like the screening models,
our theory may also provide an explanation of the coexistence of different forms of tenancy
contracts in a given region [see, e.g., Myers (1970: 227-229), Rudra (1992: 293)].
Apart from the agent-specific variation of contracts discussed above, there is another
kind of variation that is also observed. It is crop-specific. For example, in his study of West
Godavari district of the state of Andhra Pradesh in India, Rao (1971: 584-585) finds that:
“...[W]ithin the same district, share-lease and cash-lease arrangements coexist, the
latter being negligible in the rice zone and predominant in the tobacco zone...Also,
the rice crop, for which the share-lease system is extensive, is a major marketed or
cash-crop of the region, so that the share-lease system cannot readily be explained in
terms of the subsistence nature of the crop.”
Since foodgrains like rice are more likely to exhibit seasonal fluctuations of price compared
to non-food crops like tobacco, our theory may provide an explanation of the kind of crop-
specific variation described above. However, there could be other compelling reasons behind
this variation. For example, farmers of two different crops may be systematically different
from each other in terms of wealth, skill and other characteristics.
To conclude, it should be said that although our model is consistent with some of the
stylized facts of tenancy contracts, further empirical work is needed to identify the extent to
which price variation plays a role in specific contexts.
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4 Interlinked contracts
So far we have separately considered tenancy and crop-buying contracts. Now we consider
general contracts that combine both. A contract offered by the landlord is now a triplet
(α, β, γ), where α ∈ [0, 1] is the tenant’s share of output, β ∈ R is the rental transfer from
the tenant to the landlord and γ ∈ [1, p] is the unit price at which the landlord offers to buy
the tenant’s output. Such a contract is an interlinked contract, as it enables the landlord to
interact with the tenant in two markets: the land market (through share α and rent β) and
the product market (through price γ).
The strategic interaction is modeled as an extensive form game G1 that has the following
stages. In the first stage, the landlord offers a contract (α, β, γ) to the tenant. In the second
stage, the tenant can reject the contract, in which case the game terminates with both parties
getting their reservation payoffs, or he can accept, in which case the game moves on to the
third stage where the tenant decides on the amount of labor for carrying out production and
output is realized. If the output is Q: (i) the tenant keeps αQ and leaves the rest (1− α)Q
with the landlord, (ii) makes the rental transfer β to the landlord and (iii) sells his share of
output αQ to the landlord at price γ. The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Equilibrium
(SPE). We continue to maintain the assumptions of Section 3.
4.1 The tenant’s problem
Under the contract (α, β, γ), the tenant’s payoff has two components: (i) the profit from his
share α of the output that he sells at price γ and (ii) the rental transfer β. If the tenant
chooses labor input `, the output is f(`) and he obtains the revenue γαf(`) by selling his
share αf(`) to the landlord at price γ. As the cost of ` units of labor is w(`), the profit of
the tenant from his share is γαf(`) − w(`) and his payoff is γαf(`) − w(`) − β. Defining
θ := γα, this payoff is
θf(`)− w(`)− β
and β being a constant, the tenant’s problem is to choose ` to maximize
φθ(`) = θf(`)− w(`).
Note that θ is the effective unit price of the output for the tenant when he works under the
contract (α, β, γ). As α ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈ [1, p], we have θ ∈ [0, p]. The following lemma, which
characterizes the tenant’s optimal choice, follows from (3), (4) and (5) by taking x = θ.
Lemma 6 Consider a contract (α, β, γ) and let θ = γα.
(i) Under this contract, the tenant’s optimal labor input is `(θ) where `(0) = 0 and θf ′(`(θ)) =
w′(`(θ)) for θ > 0.
(ii) The output produced is F (θ) and the tenant obtains the payoff Φ(θ) − β where F (θ) =
f(`(θ)) and Φ(θ) = φθ(`(θ)) = θF (θ)− w(`(θ)).
(iii) F (0) = Φ(0) = 0, both F (θ) and Φ(θ) are strictly increasing with Φ′(θ) = F (θ) for
θ > 0.
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4.2 The landlord’s problem
By Lemma 6, when the tenant acts optimally under the contract (α, β, γ), the output pro-
duced is F (θ) where θ = γα. The payoff of the landlord has the following components.
(a) The landlord has his share of output (1 − α)F (θ). Moreover the tenant sells his share
αF (θ) to the landlord. So the landlord has the total output F (θ) at his disposal. Taking
Q = F (θ) in (10) of Lemma 2, his revenue from this output under his optimal storing
strategy is Ψp(F (θ)).
(b) The tenant sells his share of output αF (θ) to the landlord at price γ. So the landlord
pays γαF (θ) = θF (θ) to the tenant.
(c) The landlord obtains the fixed rent β from the tenant.
By (a)-(c), the payoff of the landlord is
Πp(α, β, γ) = Πp(θ, β) = Ψp (F (θ))− θF (θ) + β.
By Lemma 6, the tenant’s payoff under his optimal labor input is Φ(θ)− β. As the tenant’s
reservation payoff is Φ(α), his participation constraint is Φ(θ) − β ≥ Φ(α). For any θ, the
optimal β for the landlord is the one that binds this constraint:
βα(θ) = Φ(θ)− Φ(α).
So it is sufficient to consider contracts (α, βα(θ), γ) where α ∈ [0, 1], γ ∈ [1, p] and θ = γα ∈
[0, p]. Under such a contract, the landlord’s payoff is a function of θ, given by
Πp,α(θ) = Ψp (F (θ))− θF (θ) + Φ(θ)− Φ(α). (29)
Therefore the landlord’s problem reduces to choosing θ ∈ [0, p] to maximize Πp,α(θ).
Note that the total surplus generated by θ is Ψp (F (θ)) − θF (θ) + Φ(θ). By (29), the
landlord’s problem is to choose θ to maximize this surplus (leaving the tenant with his
reservation payoff). It will be useful to begin with the case when there is no price variation
(i.e. p = 1). Then the landlord’s revenue from output F (θ) is Ψ1(F (θ)) = F (θ) and the
total surplus is
s(θ) = (1− θ)F (θ) + Φ(θ). (30)
As Φ′(θ) = F (θ), we have s′(θ) = (1 − θ)F ′(θ) and the unique maximizer of s(θ) is θ = 1.
For p = 1, the unique contract that supports θ = 1 has α = 1, γ = 1 and β = βα(1) =
Φ(1)− Φ(α). Expectedly, this is a fixed rental contract.
Now let p > 1. Taking Q = F (θ) in (10) and by (29) and (30), the payoff of the landlord
is
Πp,α(θ) =
{
s(θ) + (p− 1)F (θ)− c (F (θ))− Φ(α) if F (θ) < Qp
s(θ) + (p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)− Φ(α) if F (θ) ≥ Qp (31)
We have seen that for p = 1, the total surplus is s(θ) and the landlord obtains s(θ)− Φ(α).
The additional terms in (31) represent the additional surplus that the landlord obtains from
his output F (θ) due to price variation . These expressions of (31) are similar to (22) [H(α)
26
being replaced by F (θ)]. Note that Πp,α(θ) is continuous at all θ and it is twice continuously
differentiable at all θ except when F (θ) = Qp.
Lemma 7 (i) If F (θ) < Qp, then Π
′ p(θ) = [p − θ − c′(F (θ))]F ′(θ) and Π′ p(θ) S 0 ⇔ p S
θ + c′(F (θ)).
(ii) If F (θ) > Qp, then Π
′ p(θ) = s′(θ) = (1− θ)F ′(θ).
(iii) Πp,α(θ) is strictly increasing for θ ∈ [0, 1).
Proof. (i) If F (θ) < Qp, (31) yields Π
′ p(θ) = s′(θ) + [p − 1 − c′(F (θ))]F ′(θ). Since s′(θ) =
(1− θ)F ′(θ), the first part follows. The second part follows by noting that F ′(θ) > 0.
(ii) Follows directly from (31).
(iii) We shall prove (iii) for F (θ) 6= Qp. By continuity, the result will also hold for
F (θ) = Qp. First let θ ∈ [0, 1) be such that F (θ) < Qp. Then p − θ > p − 1 > c′(F (θ))
[by (6)] and by (i), Π′ p(θ) > 0. Next let θ ∈ [0, 1) be such that F (θ) > Qp. Then by (ii),
Π′ p(θ) = (1− θ)F ′(θ) > 0 for θ ∈ [0, 1) and the proof is complete.
Now we characterize the optimal interlinked contracts.
Proposition 6 Consider the set I = {(α, β, γ)|α ∈ [0, 1], β ∈ R, γ ∈ [1, p]} of all interlinked
contracts. For any p > 1, the landlord has multiple optimal interlinked contracts. The optimal
contracts have the following properties, where p ≡ 1 + c′(F (1)).
(i) For any p > 1, ∃ a unique θ∗p ∈ [1, p) such that the set of all optimal interlinked contracts
is
I∗p = {(α, βα(θ∗p), γ)|α ∈ [θ∗p/p, 1], γ ∈ [θ∗p, p], γα = θ∗p}
where βα(θ∗p) = Φ(θ
∗
p)− Φ(α) that binds the tenant’s participation constraint.
(ii) θ∗p = 1 if p ∈ [1, p] and θ∗p > 1 if p > p. For p > p, θ∗p satisfies p = θ∗p + c′(F (θ∗p)).
(iii) The landlord has the entire output F (θ∗p) at his disposal. Specifically, F (θ
∗
p) = F (1) ≥
Qp if p ∈ [1, p] and F (θ∗p) < Qp if p > p.
(iv) The landlord’s net revenue from the product market (revenue under his optimal storing
strategy net of the payment he makes for the tenant’s share), given by Ψp(F (θ∗p))− θ∗pF (θ∗p),
is positive.
(v) The landlord’s total payoff is Πp,α(θ∗p) = Ψ
p(F (θ∗p))− θ∗pF (θ∗p) + βα(θ∗p). Specifically
Πp,α(θ∗p) =
{
(p− 1)Qp − c
(
Qp
)
+ Φ(1)− Φ(α) if p ∈ [1, p],
pF (θ∗p)− c(F (θ∗p))− θ∗pF (θ∗p) + Φ(θ∗p)− Φ(α) if p > p.
(vi) Πp,α(θ∗p) is strictly increasing in p. Specifically ∂Π
p,α(θ∗p)/∂p equals Qp if p ∈ [1, p] and
F (θ∗p) if p > p. Moreover limp→∞Π
p,α(θ∗p) =∞.
(vii) θ∗p is strictly increasing for p > p and θ
∗
p →∞ as p→∞.
Proof. We have shown that under the set I, the landlord’s problem reduces to choosing
θ ∈ [0, p] to maximize Πp,α(θ) given in (31). By Lemma 7(iii), it is sufficient to consider
θ ∈ [1, p]. The proof depends on whether F (1) exceeds Qp or not. Note by (6) that F (1) S
Qp ⇔ p T 1 + c′(F (1)) ≡ p.
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Case 1. p ∈ [1, p]. Then F (1) ≥ Qp. As F (.) is monotonic, F (θ) > Qp for all θ ∈ (1, p].
Then by Lemma 7(ii), Π′ p(θ) = (1− θ)F ′(θ) < 0 for θ ∈ (1, p]. So the unique maximizer of
Πp,α(θ) is θ∗p = 1.
Case 2. p > p. Then F (1) < Qp. If F (1) < Qp < F (p) then by the monotonicity of F (.), ∃
θp ∈ (1, p) such that for θ ∈ [1, p], F (θ) S Qp ⇔ θ S θp. Let us define
θ̂p =
{
θp if F (1) < Qp = F (θp) < F (p),
p if F (p) ≤ Qp.
(32)
If θ ∈ (θ̂p, p], then by (32), F (θ) > Qp and Lemma 7(ii) yields Π′p(θ) = (1 − θ)F ′(θ) < 0
(since θ > θ̂p > 1), so it is sufficient to consider θ ∈ [1, θ̂p]. If θ ∈ [1, θ̂p), then F (θ) < Qp and
by Lemma 7(i),
Π′ p(θ) S 0⇔ p S θ + c′(F (θ)). (33)
Let g(θ) := θ + c′(F (θ)). Since c′′(.) > 0 and F ′(.) > 0, g(θ) is strictly increasing. Note by
(32) that
p− g(θ̂p) =
{
p− θp − c′(Qp) = 1− θp if F (1) < Qp < F (p),
−c′(F (p)) if F (p) ≤ Qp.
Hence p − g(θ̂p) < 0. As p − g(1) = p − 1 − c′(F (1)) = p − p > 0, by the monotonicity of
g(.) ∃ θ∗p ∈ (1, θ̂p) such that for θ ∈ [1, θ̂p), p T g(θ) ⇔ θ S θ∗p. Then by (33), the unique
maximizer of Πp,α(θ) over θ ∈ [0, p] is θ∗p. The multiplicity of optimal contracts follows from
the fact that θ = θ∗p can be sustained by multiple combinations of α and γ. Now we prove
properties (i)-(iv).
Parts (i)-(iii) follows directly from Cases 1 and 2 of the proof above.
(iv) First let p ∈ [1, p]. Then θ∗p = 1 and the landlord’s net revenue from the product
market is Ψp(F (1))−F (1). As F (1) ≥ Qp for this case, by (10), Ψp(F (1)) = F (1)+(p−1)Qp−
c
(
Qp
)
> F (1). Now let p > p. Then F (θ∗p) < Qp and by (10), Ψ
p(F (θ∗p)) = pF (θ
∗
p)−c(F (θ∗p)),
so his net revenue is (p − θ∗p)F (θ∗p) − c(F (θ∗p)) = c′(F (θ∗p))F (θ∗p) − c(F (θ∗p)) [by (ii)]. Since
c(q) is strictly convex, at any q > 0, c′(q) > c(q)/q which proves that the net revenue is
positive.
(v) Follows from (10) by using (ii) and (iii).
(vi) The monotonicity for p ∈ [1, p] follows from (v) by noting that p − 1 = c′(Qp). For
p > p, it follows by the envelope theorem. Since Πp,α(θ∗p) ≥ ΠpB(γ∗p) and limp→∞ΠpB(γ∗p) =∞
(Proposition 4), the limiting property follows.
(vii) Note by (ii) that for p > p, p = g(θ∗p) where g(θ) = θ+c
′(F (θ)). Since g(θ) is strictly
increasing, θ∗p is strictly increasing for p > p. To prove the limiting property of θ
∗
p, let K > 0
and p > max{g(K), p}. Then g(θ) ≤ g(K) < p = g(θ∗p) for any θ ∈ [0, K]. So for any K > 0,
θ∗p > K for all sufficiently large values of p which proves that limp→∞ θ
∗
p =∞.
The reason behind the multiplicity of optimal contracts is clear. As the tenant’s incentive
depends on his effective unit price θ = γα, the optimal level of incentive can be sustained by
multiple combinations of γ and α. Observe from (31) that for any θ, the landlord’s payoff has
two components: (i) s(θ) (the total surplus when p = 1) and (ii) the additional surplus due
to price variation. First consider s(θ). It rises for θ < 1, reaches its maximum at θ = 1 and
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falls for θ > 1. Now consider the additional surplus due to price variation. It is increasing for
small volumes of output and becomes a constant beyond a threshold Qp (which is increasing
in p). As higher θ results in higher output, the additional surplus is weakly monotonic in θ.
So for θ < 1, both components of the landlord’s payoff rise with θ and the landlord is better
off increasing θ until it reaches 1. For θ > 1, s(θ) starts falling, so raising θ beyond this
point could be worthwhile only if it leads to substantial additional surplus. This is not the
case for small values of p. Due to increasing marginal costs of storing, it does not pay the
landlord to store a large volume when p is small, so he sells most of the output in season 1 at
price 1. As a result, it is optimal to set θ = 1 for relatively small values of p. Once p reaches
a threshold level (p > p), additional surplus is generated from larger volumes of output and
the landlord has incentive to raise θ above 1. But how far should he raise θ? Observe that
the landlord’s marginal cost of storage at output F (θ) is c′(F (θ)). Since he also pays the
tenant γαF (θ) = θF (θ), his effective marginal cost becomes θ + c′(F (θ)). The optimal level
of θ is determined by simply equating the marginal revenue p with the effective marginal
cost.
As the optimal θ in Proposition 6 is at least 1, if an optimal contract has α ∈ (0, 1),
then γ > 1. So in this model a share contract is necessarily accompanied by interlinkage (the
landlord buying the tenant’s output at a price γ that is higher than price 1 of season 1). This
contract can be viewed alternatively as follows: if the output is Q, the landlord effectively
provides a subsidy of (γ−1)αQ to the tenant. Thus, an interlinked transaction in our model
can be interpreted as a cost-sharing arrangement. Under this broader interpretation, our
theory has some empirical support as share contracts in practice often involve cost-sharing
[see, e.g., Bardhan and Rudra (1978: 99-100), Rudra (1992: 293-294), Reddy (1996: 52-53),
Sharma and Dre`ze (1996: 8)]. So far as empirical support for general interlinked contracts
is concerned, one problem is the lack of sufficient empirical work on this, as recently pointed
out by Bardhan (2005: 88):
“There is now quite a bit of theoretical literature...on interlinked contracts in a poor
agrarian economy, but there is even now very little empirical work on the subject. Our
dataset [Bardhan & Rudra (1978)] is one of the earliest and still the largest that exists
on such interlinked contracts.”
Evidence of tenancy-credit linkage can be found in Bardhan and Rudra (1978: 99). Jodha
(1984) finds that under a “fairly broad” definition of interlinked operations, between 6 to
21 percent of tenancy transactions of his survey had some form of interlinkage (ibid: 110).
The following is a specific evidence from Akola district in the state of Maharashtra in India
(ibid: 111):
“In the Akola villages, the few interlinked transactions concerned primarily land lease,
credit and marketing. One of the reasons for this pattern was the public intervention
in the form of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation
in Maharashtra...Small farmers with a limited holding capacity sometimes had to use
large farmers as informal intermediaries to do their cotton marketing, a practice that
led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transactions.”
Although the tenancy-marketing interlinkage above arose out of special circumstances, nev-
ertheless the nature of the transaction is very similar to the one considered in this paper
where the tenant, lacking storage facility, sells his output to the landlord.
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4.3 Motivation for a refinement criterion: imperfect competition
in rural product markets
Going back to Proposition 6, now the question is, how to resolve the multiplicity of optimal
contracts obtained there? So far we have implicitly assumed that the landlord is a monopolist
in the land market and a monopsonist in the product market. While the landlord can
exercise monopoly power over the land he owns, empirical evidence suggests that this is not
necessarily the case in the rural product market, which closely resembles what one might
call a situation of imperfect competition [see, e.g., Baker (1984: 239), Rudra (1992: 53-54),
Haymai et al. (1999: 81-83)]. We resolve the multiplicity by proposing an equilibrium
refinement that takes into consideration the fact that the landlord might face potential
competition in the product market. The following description of a rural product market,
taken from Rudra (1992: 53-54), will be helpful in motivating our analysis:
“Our investigations in more than 200 villages in West Bengal and Bihar indicate the
following ranking among different categories of traders in terms of prices paid by them
as purchasers of grains.
1. village retail shops.
2. big farmers acting as traders.
3. village wholesalers.
4. travelling traders (or itinerant merchants) and other village level traders.
5. hats (that is, non-permanent markets centres functioning on a number of days per
month or per week), market wholesalers, and rice mills.
The lowest prices are paid by the village retail shops and the highest prices are paid
by the rice mills, market wholesalers, and hats.”
Now we posit a situation that is plausible in a poor agrarian economy and broadly reflective
of the essential findings of Rudra (1992). Consider a small farmer who works as a tenant
for a landlord. Out of the marketing channels given above, the price is the highest at hats
(category 5) that serves as the dominant outlet for the landlord. Due to transportation and
other costs, the tenant does not have access to this channel. If no intermediate channel is
available, the tenant has to sell his product in village retail shops (category 1) that pay the
lowest price. As a buyer of the tenant’s output, the landlord belongs to category 2 above
and pays a price no lower than that paid by the retail shops. It is evident that in trading
with the tenant, the landlord does not enjoy monopoly power and he might face competition
from other agents (belonging to categories 3 and 4). Suppose such an agent appears with
some small but positive probability. Then the question is, out of all contracts obtained in
Proposition 6, what are the ones that the landlord will choose once he anticipates such a
possibility? It will be shown that there is a unique contract that satisfies this refinement
criterion and it results in a sharecropping contract.
4.4 The perturbed game G1(ε)
The possibility of competition in the product market is modeled by the perturbed game
G1(ε) that has the following stages. In the first stage, the landlord offers a contract (α, β, γ)
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to the tenant. In the second stage, the tenant either rejects the contract, in which case the
game terminates with both parties getting their reservation payoffs, or he accepts, in which
case the game moves to the third stage where the tenant carries out production and output
is realized. If the output is Q: (i) the tenant keeps αQ and leaves the rest (1 − α)Q with
the landlord and (ii) makes the rental transfer β to the landlord. At the end of this stage:
(a) with probability ε ∈ (0, 1), a third agent, who we call the ε-agent, emerges and (b) with
probability 1− ε, he does not emerge.
If the ε-agent does not emerge, then G1(ε) proceeds like the unperturbed game G1: the
tenant sells his share αQ to the landlord at price γ, the landlord has output Q at his disposal
that he sells using his optimal storing strategy, payoffs are realized and the game terminates.
If the ε-agent emerges, then in the fourth stage he decides whether to buy the tenant’s
output or not. Accordingly he offers a trading contract to the tenant. The tenant then
decides whether to sell his output to the landlord or the ε-agent and trade takes place
between one of the following buyer-seller pairs: (landlord—tenant) or (ε-agent—tenant). In
the fifth stage the ε-agent decides whether to buy the landlord’s output or not and he offers
a trading contract to the landlord. The landlord then decides whether to keep his output or
sell it to the ε-agent and trade takes place potentially between the ε-agent and the landlord.5
In the last stage, any party that has positive output at his disposal from the previous stage
of trading (the landlord or the ε-agent or both), sells it using his optimal storing strategy.
Finally payoffs are obtained and the game terminates. The solution concept is the notion of
Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SPBE).
Definition: Let p > 1. Consider the set of all optimal interlinked contracts I∗p of the
unperturbed game G1.We say that a contract (α, β, γ) ∈ I∗p is robust to the emergence of the
ε-agent if there is a sequence {(α(ε), β(ε), γ(ε))} such that: (i) for ε ∈ (0, 1), (α(ε), β(ε), γ(ε))
is the contract offered by the landlord in an SPBE of G1(ε) and (ii) (α(ε), β(ε), γ(ε)) →
(α, β, γ) as ε→ 0 + .
4.5 The problem of the ε-agent
4.5.1 Storage cost and optimal storing strategy of the ε-agent
Like the landlord, the ε-agent can store his output in season 1 and sell it in season 2. We
assume that the ε-agent has the same storage cost as the landlord (see Section 3.2.1). Due to
symmetry of storage costs, the ε-agent has the same optimal storing strategy as the landlord
(see Lemma 2) and his revenue under his optimal storing strategy when he has output Q at
his disposal is Ψp(Q), given by (10) of Lemma 2.
Remarks. The ε-agent represents a small trader in the village. Given that, it is more
realistic to assume that he has a higher storage cost compared to the landlord. We assume
symmetric storage costs for analytic convenience. Later we argue that (see page 37) our
qualitative conclusions will not be altered if the ε-agent has a higher storage cost than the
landlord, as long as it is not too high. If the storage cost of the ε-agent is too high, then
obviously he does not pose any serious competition to the landlord.
5This trading sequence ensures that the number of transactions is minimum and trade takes place at
most once between two parties.
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4.5.2 Trading contracts of the ε-agent
As in the rest of the paper, we restrict to linear contracts. We assume that if the ε-agent
trades with a party (tenant/landlord), he has to buy the entire output that is at that party’s
disposal. Then there is no loss of generality in restricting to trading contracts where the
ε-agent offers to buy the output in return for a fixed lump-sum payment. The set of trading
contracts is
V = {(λT , µT , λL, µL)|λT ∈ {0, 1}, λL ∈ {0, 1}, µT ∈ R+, µL ∈ R+}.
The variables λT and λL are indicator variables: λT = 0 means the ε-agent does not offer
to trade with the tenant; λT = 1 means he does. Similarly λL represents whether or not he
offers to trade with the landlord. The variables µT and µL are the lump-sum payments at
which the ε-agent offers to buy the outputs of the tenant and the landlord. It is clear that
µi comes into play only if λi = 1.
Bargaining power. The ε-agent, being a small trader, has an economic position in the
village that is somewhere between the landlord and the tenant. So it can be expected that
the ε-agent has a relatively large bargaining power over the tenant, while the landlord has a
relatively large bargaining power over the ε-agent.
We assume that the ε-agent has full bargaining power over the tenant (so that in equi-
librium, the tenant will be made just indifferent between the offers of the landlord and the
ε-agent). As before, the full bargaining power assumption is done for analytic convenience
and our qualitative conclusions will not be altered for small variations in full bargaining
power (see page 37).
Regarding the relative bargaining powers between the landlord and the ε-agent, we make
a very weak assumption. It is only assumed that the landlord has a very slight edge in
bargaining which is modeled as follows: there is a small but positive constant τ > 0 such
that the landlord trades with the ε-agent only if the difference between the landlord’s payoff
from trading and not trading is at least τ . It is shown below that this slight edge in bargaining
is enough to ensure that the ε-agent does not trade with the landlord.
Recall that due to symmetry of storage costs, for both the landlord and the ε-agent, the
revenue from output Q under the optimal storing is Ψp(Q), given by (10).
Lemma 8 Consider the game G1(ε) and suppose the landlord has offered to buy the tenant’s
output at price γ ∈ [1, p]. The following hold in any SPBE of G1(ε).
(i) If the tenant has output QT and the ε-agent trades with the tenant, then µT = γQT .
(ii) If the landlord has output QL and the ε-agent trades with the landlord, then µL =
Ψp(QL) + τ .
(iii) λL = 0, i.e., the ε-agent does not offer to trade with the landlord.
Proof. (i) As the landlord has offered price γ, the tenant will trade with the ε-agent only
if µT ≥ γQT . Given the full bargaining power of the ε-agent, he will choose µT = γQT .
(ii) The landlord’s revenue from output QL under the optimal storing strategy is Ψ
p(QL).
Given the landlord’s bargaining edge with the ε-agent, he will sell his output to the ε-agent
only if µL ≥ Ψp(QL) + τ and in equilibrium, the ε-agent will choose µL = Ψp(QL) + τ .
(iii) W.l.o.g., consider only the trading contracts that are accepted. Under such a contract
(λT , µT , λL, µL) ∈ V, the ε-agent obtains output λTQT + λLQL, pays λTµT + λLµL and
earns revenue Ψp(λTQT + λLQL) by using the optimal storing strategy. So his payoff is
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Ψp(λTQT + λLQL)− λTµT − λLµL. Using the equilibrium values of µT and µL from (i) and
(ii), this payoff would be
pip(λT , λL) = Ψ
p(λTQT + λLQL)− λTγQT − λL[Ψp(QL) + τ ].
Hence we have
pip(λT , 0)− pip(λT , 1) =
{
τ if λT = 0
Ψp(QT ) + Ψ
p(QL)−Ψp(QT +QL) + τ if λT = 1
As Ψp(QT )+Ψ
p(QL)−Ψp(QT+QL) > 0 for QL, QT > 0 [Lemma 2(vi)], pip(λT , 0) > pip(λT , 1).
So, in equilibrium, λL = 0, i.e., the ε-agent does not offer to trade with the landlord.
The result above is driven mainly by the decreasing returns to scale of the revenue
function Ψp(Q) [Lemma 2(vi)]. Let QT , QL > 0. The total trading surplus does not depend
on transfers from one party to another, so it is simply the sum of revenues of the ε-agent
and the landlord from their optimal storing strategies. If the ε-agent trades only with the
tenant, then the trading surplus is Ψp(QT ) + Ψ
p(QL). However, if the ε-agent trades with
both parties, then the surplus is Ψp(QT +QL) < Ψ
p(QT ) + Ψ
p(QL). The surplus goes down
due to decreasing returns (as QT + QL is being stored in only the facility of the ε-agent
instead of being divided with the facility of the landlord). As the landlord and the tenant
have to be paid their opportunity costs, a lower trading surplus results in lower revenue for
the ε-agent. Now, if the ε-agent trades only with the landlord, his revenue Ψp(QL) equals the
opportunity cost of the landlord and even a slight edge in the landlord’s bargaining power
(given by τ > 0) induces the ε-agent to not trade with the landlord.
4.6 Stage game of G1(ε) following the landlord’s contract offer
Now consider the stage game of G1(ε) that follows the landlord’s contract (α, β, γ). Following
this contract, the tenant sells his output at price γ regardless of who the buyer is [Lemma
8(i)]. So his problem stays the same as in the unperturbed game G1 and it depends only
on θ = γα. The output produced is F (θ) and the tenant obtains Φ(θ) − β (Lemma 6). As
before, the landlord sets the rent βα(θ) = Φ(θ)−Φ(α) that binds the tenant’s participation
constraint. So for the landlord, it is sufficient to consider contracts (α, βα(θ), γ). As the
ε-agent does not trade with the landlord [Lemma 8(iii)], his trading options are (i) to trade
with the tenant and (ii) not to trade at all.
Lemma 9 Let p > 1. Suppose the landlord offers the contract (α, βα(θ), γ) to the tenant,
where θ = γα ∈ (0, p], α ∈ [θ/p, 1] and γ ∈ [θ, p]. In any SPBE of G1(ε) after this offer the
following hold.
(i) The output produced is F (θ) and after paying the landlord’s share and rent, the output at
the tenant’s disposal is αF (θ).
(ii) If the ε-agent trades with the tenant, then he pays the tenant θF (θ) and obtains
pipA(θ, α) = Ψ
p(αF (θ))− θF (θ).
The ε-agent trades with the tenant if and only if pipA(θ, α) ≥ 0.
(iii) pipA(θ, α) is strictly increasing in α, pi
p
A(θ, 1) = Ψ
p(F (θ))− θF (θ) and pip(θ, θ/p) < 0.
(iv) Trading between the ε-agent and the tenant depends on θ and α as follows.
33
(a) If pipA(θ, 1) < 0, then for any α ∈ [θ/p, 1], the ε-agent does not trade with the tenant.
(b) If pipA(θ, 1) = 0, then the ε-agent trades with the tenant if and only if α = 1.
(c) If pipA(θ, 1) > 0, then ∃ αpA(θ) ∈ (θ/p, 1) such that for α ∈ [θ/p, 1], pipA(θ, α) S 0 ⇔ α S
αpA(θ). Consequently the ε-agent trades with the tenant if and only if α ≥ αpA(θ).
Proof. Part (i) is direct. To prove (ii), take QT = αF (θ) in Lemma 8(i). As the tenant
obtains γαF (θ) = θF (θ) if he sells his output to the landlord, in equilibrium, the ε-agent pays
the tenant θF (θ). If the ε-agent buys the tenant’s output αF (θ), then by his optimal storing
strategy he obtains the revenue Ψp(αF (θ)) yielding the payoff pipA(θ, α) = Ψ
p(αF (θ))−θF (θ).
(iii) As F (θ) > 0 for θ > 0, the first part follows by the monotonicity of Ψp(.) (Lemma
2). The second part is direct. To prove the third part, note that Ψp(Q) < pQ for any
Q > 0 due to positive cost of storage. Taking (θ/p)F (θ) = Q, we have θF (θ) = pQ and
pip(θ, θ/p) = Ψp (Q)− pQ < 0.
Part (iv) follows directly by part (iii).
The result above is fairly intuitive. To buy the tenant’s output αF (θ), the ε-agent pays
him γαF (θ) = θF (θ). So for fixed θ, the ε-agent’s revenue goes up as the tenant’s share
α increases. It is maximum when α = 1, given by pipA(1, θ) = Ψ
p(F (θ)) − θF (θ) which is
also the landlord’s net revenue from the product market in the unperturbed game G1 (the
revenues are equal due to symmetry of storage costs). Now, if pipA(1, θ) < 0, then regardless
of α, it is not worthwhile for the ε-agent to trade with the tenant. However, if pipA(1, θ) > 0,
then trading is worthwhile for relatively large values of α. We know that pipA(1, θ) > 0 under
the optimal θ of the unperturbed game G1 [Prop. 6(iv), page 27], so for α ≥ αpA(θ), trade
between the ε-agent and the tenant is feasible. In what follows it will be shown that in the
perturbed game G1(ε), it is optimal for landlord to choose α = α
p
A(θ) that ensures that in
trading with the tenant, the ε-agent just breaks even.
4.7 The problem of the landlord
Now we are in a position to solve the landlord’s problem. As we know, for the landlord it is
sufficient to consider contracts (α, βα(θ), γ) for θ = γα ∈ [0, p], α ∈ [θ/p, 1] and γ ∈ [θ, p].6
We know that under this contract the output produced is F (θ). To determine the expected
payoff of the landlord in the perturbed game G1(ε), we observe the following, where Ψ
p(Q)
[given by (10)] is the landlord’s revenue under his optimal storing strategy when he has
output Q.
(a) Regardless of the emergence or trading nature of the ε-agent, the landlord obtains the
rental transfer βα(θ) = Φ(θ)− Φ(α) from the tenant.
(b) If the ε-agent does not trade with the tenant, the landlord has the total output F (θ)
(his own share 1 − α plus the tenant’s share α) at his disposal. The revenue from
this output under his optimal storing strategy is Ψp(F (θ)). Moreover the landlord has
to pay γαF (θ) = θF (θ) to the tenant, so his net revenue from the product market is
Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ).
6As γ ≤ p, we have θ = γα ≤ αp implying α ≥ θ/p. As α ≤ 1, we have θ = γα ≤ γ, so γ ≥ θ.
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(c) If the ε-agent trades with the tenant, then (i) the landlord does not have to make any
payment for the tenant’s share of output and (ii) he has only his share (1 − α)F (θ).
So his revenue from the product market is simply the revenue from output (1− α)F (θ)
under his optimal storing strategy, which is Ψp((1− α)F (θ)).
By Lemma 9(iv), whether the ε-agent trades with the tenant or not depends on θ and α.
Let λpT (θ, α) be the indicator variable that equals 1 if the ε-agent trades with the tenant and
0 otherwise. Since the ε-agent emerges with probability ε, by (a)-(c), the expected payoff of
the landlord is
Πp,αε (θ, α) = β
α(θ) + (1− ε) [Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue in (b)
+ε [λpT (θ, α) Ψ
p((1− α)F (θ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue in (c)
+(1− λpT (θ, α)) {Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
revenue in (b)
] . (34)
When the ε-agent does not trade with the tenant, the landlord’s payoff is the same as in the
unperturbed game G1. It depends only on θ, given by
Πp,α(θ) = Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ) + βα(θ).
When the ε-agent trades with the tenant, the payoff changes from Πp,α(θ) (the change could
be positive, negative or zero). This change is the difference between the revenues of (c) and
(b):
Ωp(θ, α) = Ψp((1− α)F (θ))− [Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ)] . (35)
By (34) and (35), the landlord’s expected payoff in G1(ε) is
Πp,αε (θ, α) = Π
p,α(θ) + ελpT (θ, α)Ω
p(θ, α). (36)
Let us define
Jp = {(θ, α)|α ∈ [θ/p, 1], θ ∈ [0, p]}.
The landlord’s problem in the first stage of G1(ε) is to choose (θ, α) ∈ Jp to maximize
Πp,αε (θ, α). As the functions in (36) are bounded for (θ, α) ∈ JP , the maximization problem
has a solution, i.e., the game G1(ε) has a Subgame Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SPBE)
for any ε ∈ (0, 1).
4.7.1 SPBE of G1(ε)
Note that whether the ε-agent trades with the tenant [λpT (θ, α) = 1] or not [λ
p
T (θ, α) = 0]
depends on whether pipA(θ, 1) = Ψ
p(F (θ)) − θF (θ) is positive or not [Lemma 9(iv)]. It will
be useful for our analysis to partition [0, p] = Ep ∪ Ep where
Ep = {θ ∈ [0, p] |Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ) > 0} and Ep = [0, p]/Ep.
Also recall by Proposition 6 that for p > 1, θ∗p is the unique maximizer of Π
p,α(θ) over
θ ∈ [0, p].
Lemma 10 The following hold for any p > 1 and ε ∈ (0, 1).
(i) Let θ ∈ Ep. Then Πp,αε (θ, α) = Πp,α(θ) for any α ∈ [θ/p, 1].
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(ii) Let θ ∈ Ep. Then ∃ αpA(θ) ∈ (θ/p, 1), satisfying pipA(αpA(θ), θ) = 0 (i.e., at α = αpA(θ), the
ε-agent just breaks even in his trade with the tenant), such that
Πp,αε (θ, α) =
{
Πp,α(θ) if α ∈ [θ/p, αpA(θ)),
Πp,α(θ) + εΩp(θ, α) if α ∈ [αpA(θ), 1]. (37)
(a) Ωp(θ, α) is strictly decreasing in α and ∃ αpL(θ) ∈ (αpA(θ), 1) such that for α ∈ [αpA(θ), 1],
Ωp(θ, α) T 0⇔ α S αpL(θ).
(b) (Pareto improving region) If α ∈ [αpA(θ), αpL(θ)], then pipA(θ, α) ≥ 0 (the ε-agent obtains
a non-negative payoff by trading with the tenant) and Ωp(θ, α) ≥ 0 (change in the landlord’s
payoff due to trading between the ε-agent and the tenant is non-negative).
(c) Πp,αε (θ, α
p
A(θ)) > Π
p,α(θ) and the unique maximum of Πp,αε (θ, α) over α ∈ [θ/p, 1] is
attained at α = αpA(θ).
(iii) θ∗p ∈ Ep. Consequently, if θ ∈ E
p
, then Πp,αε (θ
∗
p, α
p
A(θ
∗
p)) > Π
p,α
ε (θ, α) for any α ∈ [θ/p, 1].
(iv) Let (θM , αM) be a maximizer of Π
p,α
ε (θ, α) over (θ, α) ∈ Jp. Then θM ∈ Ep and αM =
αpA(θM).
(v) Let {(θp(ε), αpA(θp(ε)))} be a sequence such that for ε ∈ (0, 1), (θp(ε), αpA(θp(ε)) is a
maximizer of Πp,αε (θ, α) over (θ, α) ∈ Jp. Then limε↓0((θp(ε), αpA(θp(ε)) = (θ∗p, αpA(θ∗p)).
Proof. (i) Let θ ∈ Ep, i.e., Ψp(F (θ))−θF (θ) ≤ 0. If Ψp(F (θ))−θF (θ) < 0, then λpT (θ, α) = 0
for all α ∈ [θ/p, 1] [Lemma 9(iv)] and (36) yields the result. If Ψp(F (θ))− θF (θ) = 0, then
λpT (θ, α) = 0 for α ∈ [θ/p, 1) [Lemma 9(iv)] and for α = 1, Ωp(θ, 1) = 0 [by (35)], so by (36),
the result follows.
(ii) Let θ ∈ Ep, i.e., Ψp(F (θ))−θF (θ) > 0. Then by Lemma 9(iv) ∃ αpA(θ) ∈ (θ/p, 1) such
that λpT (θ, α) = 0 if α ∈ [θ/p, αpA(θ)) and λpT (θ, α) = 1 if α ∈ [αpA(θ), 1]. Then (37) follows by
(36).
(ii)(a) As Ψp(.) is monotonic, by (35), Ωp(θ, α) is strictly decreasing in α. Since Ψp(0) = 0,
(35) yields Ωp(θ, 1) < 0 for θ ∈ Ep.We complete the proof by showing that Ωp(θ, αpA(θ)) > 0.
As pipA(θ, α
p
A(θ)) = Ψ
p(αpA(θ)F (θ))− θF (θ) = 0 [Lemma 9(iv)], by (35) we have
Ωp(θ, αpA(θ)) = Ψ
p ((1− αpA(θ))F (θ)) + Ψp (αpA(θ)F (θ))−Ψp(F (θ))
which is positive since Ψp(Q1) + Ψ
p(Q2) > Ψ
p(Q1 +Q2) for any Q1, Q2 > 0 [Lemma 2(vi)].
(ii)(b) Follows by Lemma 9(iv) and part (ii)(a).
(ii)(c) As Ωp(θ, αpA(θ)) > 0 [by (a)], (37) yields Π
p,α
ε (θ, α
p
A(θ)) > Π
p,α(θ). Since Ωp(θ, α) is
strictly decreasing in α, by (37), Πp,αε (θ, α
p
A(θ)) > Π
p,α
ε (θ, α) for α ∈ (αpA(θ), 1] which proves
(c).
(iii) That θ∗p ∈ Ep is direct by Prop. 6(iv). Then by (ii), Πp,αε (θ∗p, αpA(θ∗p)) > Πp,α(θ∗p).
Since θ∗p is the unique maximizer of Π
p,α(θ), for any θ ∈ Ep, Πp,α(θ∗p) > Πp,α(θ) and the result
follows by (i).
(iv) By (iii), θM ∈ Ep and then by (ii), αM = αpA(θM).
(v) Since θ∗p ∈ Ep, ∃ a small δp > 0 such that Nδp(θ∗p) ≡ [θ∗p − δp, θ∗p + δp] ⊆ Ep. As θ∗p
is the unique maximizer of Πp,α(θ), by (36), ∃ εp ∈ (0, 1) such that: if (θp(ε), αpA(θp(ε)) is
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a maximizer of Πp,αε (θ, α), then θp(ε) ∈ Nδp(θ∗p) for all ε ∈ (0, εp). Hence for ε ∈ (0, εp), the
maximization problem reduces to choosing θ ∈ Nδp(θ∗p) to maximize Πp,αε (θ, αpA(θ)). Since
αpA(θ) is the solution of Ψ
p(αF (θ))−θF (θ) = 0, it is continuous in θ and so is Πp,αε (θ, αpA(θ)).
When ε = 0, Πp,α0 (θ, α) = Π
p,α(θ) and θ∗p is its unique maximizer. Hence limε↓0 θp(ε) = θ
∗
p
and consequently limε↓0 α
p
A(θp(ε)) = α
p
A(θ
∗
p). This completes the proof.
In Figure 2, Πp,αε (θ, α) is depicted as function of α for fixed θ ∈ Ep. For α ∈ [θ/p, αpA(θ)),
the ε-agent does not trade with the tenant and the landlord obtains Πp,α(θ) (the line AB0).
For α ∈ [αpA(θ), 1], the ε-agent trades with the tenant. As the trading pattern changes at
α = αpA(θ), the payoff function has a jump there. In Figure 2, the payoff for α > α
p
A(θ)
has been drawn for two different values of ε: ε1 < ε2, presented by the curves Bε1Cε1 and
Bε2Cε2 . As ε becomes close to zero, these curves converge to the line B0C0.
As the ε-agent trades with the tenant for α > αpA(θ), the landlord is left with his own
share (1 − α)F (θ). His revenue falls with α, so the drawback of a fixed rental contract is
immediate. At α = 1, his revenue from the product market drops from Ψp(F (θ))−θF (θ) > 0
to zero [Ωp(θ, 1) < 0]. The function Ωp(θ, α) continues to stay negative until α falls to αpL(θ).
The set [αpA(θ), α
p
L(θ)] of share contracts presents the Pareto improving (PI) region: trading
between the ε-agent and the tenant improves the payoffs of both the landlord and the ε-agent,
keeping the tenant indifferent. However, the gains of the landlord and the ε-agent move in
opposite directions: each prefers to have a high output at his disposal, so the landlord prefers
α to be low while the ε-agent prefers it to be high. The landlord, having the advantage of
choosing the contract, sets α = αpA(θ), which is the lowest possible α in the PI region, and
the ε-agent just breaks even.
Why is there a non-empty PI region, i.e., why it is the case that αpA(θ) < α
p
L(θ)? When
there is trade between the ε-agent and the tenant, the tenant’s payoff does not change, the
landlord’s change in payoff is Ωp(θ, α) = Ψp((1 − α)F (θ)) − [Ψp(F (θ)) − θF (θ)] and the
ε-agent obtains pipA(θ, α) = Ψ
p(αF (θ))− θF (θ). The total trading surplus is
Ωp(θ, α) + pipA(θ, α) = Ψ
p(αF (θ)) + Ψp((1− α)F (θ))−Ψp(F (θ)).
Due to decreasing returns to scale property of the revenue function Ψp(Q) [Lemma 2(vi)],
the total trading surplus is positive. Hence if the surplus of one party is zero, the other party
must have a positive surplus. As pipA(θ, α) = 0 at α = α
p
A(θ), Ω
p(θ, αpA(θ)) must be positive.
As Ωp(θ, α) is decreasing in α and Ωp(θ, αpL(θ)) = 0, it follows that α
p
A(θ) < α
p
L(θ), resulting
in a non-empty PI region.
1. Variation in bargaining power: Observe that since the PI region is a non-empty
interval, our qualitative conclusions will not be altered for small variations in the relative
bargaining powers of the parties. For example, if the tenant has a larger bargaining power,
the ε-agent has to pay him more to buy his output. So the break-even point of the ε-agent
will go up above αpA(θ). It will still be optimal for the landlord to choose a share contract,
but the specific share will change.
2. Asymmetry of storage costs: The PI region will not disappear if the ε-agent has
a higher storage cost, provided it is not too high. For higher costs, his payoff falls to
pipA(θ, α) = Ψ˜
p(αF (θ))− θF (θ) where Ψ˜p(αF (θ)) < Ψp(αF (θ)), so his break-even point goes
up to α˜pA(θ) > α
p
A(θ). As long as the storage cost difference is not too high, α˜
p
A(θ) will stay
below αpL(θ) and there will still be a non-empty PI region. Now suppose the ε-agent’s storage
cost is lower. The result that he does not trade with the landlord (Lemma 8) will continue
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to hold provided his cost is not too low. His break-even point will fall below αpA(θ) for lower
costs and the PI region will expand. To sum up, our results are robust to relatively small
asymmetries in storage costs.
Now we present the result on equilibrium refinement.
Proposition 7 (1) Let p > 1. For any ε ∈ (0, 1) the perturbed game G1(ε) has an SPBE.
Let (α, β, γ) be the contract offered by the landlord in an SPBE of G1(ε) and let θ = γα.
Then the following hold.
(i) α = αpA(θ) and β = Φ(θ)− Φ(α).
(ii) The tenant obtains his reservation payoff Φ(α). If the ε-agent emerges, he buys the
tenant’s share of output αpA(θ)F (θ) by paying the tenant θF (θ). If the ε-agent does not
emerge, the landlord buys the tenant’s share by making the same payment.
(iii) By trading with the tenant the ε-agent just breaks even. He obtains pipA(θ, α
p
A(θ)) = 0.
(iv) The landlord obtains the expected payoff Πp,δ(θ) + εΩp(θ, αpA(θ)) > Π
p,δ(θ).
(2) Let p > 1. Consider the set I∗p of all optimal interlinked contracts for the landlord in the
unperturbed game G1. There is a unique (α, β, γ) ∈ I∗p that is robust to the emergence of the
ε-agent. The robust contract has the following properties where p ≡ 1 + c′(F (1)).
(i) It prescribes positive shares of output for both the tenant and the landlord. Specifically,
α = αpA(θ
∗
p), β = Φ(θ
∗
p)− Φ(α) and γ = θ∗p/αpA(θ∗p).
(ii) αpA(θ
∗
p) is strictly decreasing for p ∈ (1, p) and limp↓1αpA(θ∗p) = 1.
Proof. (1) and 2(i) follow by Lemma 10. For 2(ii), note that pipA(θ, α
p
A(θ)) = Ψ
p(αpA(θ)F (θ))−
θF (θ) = 0. By Proposition 6, for p ∈ (1, p), θ∗p = 1, so αpA(θ∗p) = αpA(1) and Ψp(αpA(1)F (1)) =
F (1). Since for any α > 0, Ψp(αF (1)) is strictly increasing in p, it follows that αpA(1) is
strictly decreasing for p ∈ (1, p). For p = 1, the unique contract has α = 1 and the limiting
property is immediate.
Proposition 7 shows that the unique contract that is robust to the emergence of the ε-
agent results in a share contract. Competition in the product market generates a subset of
Pareto improving share contracts out of the multiple optimal contracts of the unperturbed
game G1. It is optimal for the landlord to choose that specific contract in this subset where
his own share is maximum. As a result, the ε-agent just breaks even in trading with the
tenant.
Recall from Proposition 6 that for p ∈ (1, p), θ∗p = 1 and the output stays fixed at F (1).
For this reason, as p falls, the tenant’s share has to be increased to make sure that the
ε-agent trades with the tenant. Now consider p > p. For α > 0, the ε-agent’s payoff when
he trades with the tenant is pipA(θ
∗
p, α) = Ψ
p(αF (θ∗p))− θ∗pF (θ∗p). For p > p, the output F (θ∗p)
increases due to increasing θ∗p, so both components of the ε-agent’s payoff increase in p. Due
to this reason, αpA(θ
∗
p) may or may not be monotonic p > p. More structure in the model is
needed to have a clear conclusion on how αpA(θ
∗
p) behaves for p > p.
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5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a theory of sharecropping on the basis of price behavior
in agriculture and imperfectly competitive nature of rural product markets. Considering a
contractual setting where the landlord can take advantage of seasonal variation of price but
the tenant-farmer cannot, first we have shown the optimality of sharecropping in the class of
tenancy contracts. We have also shown that share contracts dominate crop-buying contracts
provided the price variation is not too large. Then considering interlinked contracts that
have both tenancy and crop-buying elements, it has been shown that there are multiple
optimal contracts. Finally proposing an equilibrium refinement that incorporates imperfect
competition in the rural product market, we have shown that the unique contract that is
robust to this refinement results in a share contract. In our model, the price differential
between the contracting parties is the main driving force behind sharecropping. It is further
reinforced by the emergence of a small trader who seeks to gain from arbitrage. When the
price differential goes down, this rationale for sharecropping will gradually disappear. For
example, if there are entities (e.g., the government or an outside firm that has no stake at
small village-level competition) that can credibly assure the tenant of a high price, then fixed
rental contracts would be gradually more preferable for the landlord.
In proposing a theory of tenancy contracts based on price fluctuations, this paper relates
itself to two general themes of development economics: (i) volatilities of different kinds have
important effects on rural economies of poor countries and (ii) institutions and contractual
forms can often be endogenous to these volatilities. Our model is consistent with some
of the stylized facts of tenancy contracts (e.g., agent-specific and crop-specific variation of
contractual forms, incidence of cost-sharing with share contracts). However, further empirical
work is necessary to see the extent to which price variation plays a role in explaining these
facts in specific contexts.
One important question regarding sharecropping is whether it results in lower productiv-
ity compared to fixed rental contracts. There is a large empirical literature that addresses this
question [see, e.g., Rao (1971), Bell (1977), Chattopadhyay (1979), Bliss and Stern (1982),
Shaban (1987)], but the evidence is mixed. Our theoretical results show that if the landlord
is restricted to only tenancy contracts, then the output from sharecropping is low (Prop 5),
but this is no longer the case under more general contracts (Prop 6). This is intuitive. If
the contract forms allow the landlord to extract more surplus, he will have incentive to raise
productivity. Thus, sharecropping in itself might not necessarily lead to low productivity.
It is well recognized that there cannot be a single explanation of the sharecropping
institution. As Singh (1989: 34) points out:
“Sharecropping has existed in various times and places in various forms. It has disap-
peared over time and reappeared. Sometimes the output share equals the cost share;
sometimes it does not. Sometimes the tenant’s share is one-half; sometimes it is not.
Sometimes productivity is higher on sharecropped land than on other types of ten-
ancy or with self-cultivation; sometimes it is not. Sometimes sharecroppers are poor;
sometimes they are prosperous. Sometimes sharecroppers produce risky cash crops;
sometimes they produce for subsistence. I do not think a single theory can capture all
of these aspects of sharecropping”
In this spirit, it can be said that this paper complements the existing theories of the literature.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2(v)-(vi) To prove (v), note that (a) Ψp(Q) is strictly concave for
Q ∈ [0, Qp] [since c(.) is strictly convex] and (b) Ψp(Q) is linear for Q ≥ Qp.
To complete the proof, let Q1 ∈ [0, Qp), Q2 > Qp and Q3 = λQ1+(1−λ)Q2 for λ ∈ (0, 1).
In what follows, we show that
Ψp(Q3) > λΨ
p(Q1) + (1− λ)Ψp(Q2). (38)
First let Q3 ≥ Qp. Then by (10), Ψp(Q3) = Ψp(Q2)− (Q2−Q3) = Ψp(Q2)− λ(Q2−Q1).
Using this fact and (10), we have Ψp(Q3)−[λΨp(Q1)+(1−λ)Ψp(Q2)] = λ[ζp(Qp)−ζp(Q1)] > 0
which proves (38).
To prove (38) for Q3 < Qp, note that since Q1 < Qp < Q2, ∃ λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
Qp = λQ1 + (1− λ)Q2. By the last paragraph, we know that (38) holds for Qp, hence
Ψp(Qp) > λΨ
p(Q1) + (1− λ)Ψp(Q2). (39)
Now let Q3 < Qp. Then ∃ λ ∈ (0, 1) such that Q3 = λQ1+(1−λ)Qp. Since Ψp(Q) is strictly
concave over Q ∈ [0, Qp], we have
Ψp(Q) > λΨp(Q1) + (1− λ)Ψp(Qp). (40)
As Q3 = λQ1 + (1 − λ)Q2 = λQ1 + (1 − λ)Qp and Qp = λQ1 + (1 − λ)Q2, we have
λ = λ+ (1− λ)λ. Using this fact and combining (39) and (40), (38) follows.
(vi) First let Q1, Q2 be such that both are at least Qp. Then clearly Q1+Q2 is more than
Qp and by (10), Ψ
p(Q1) + Ψ
p(Q2)−Ψp(Q1 +Q2) = ζp(Qp) > 0.
Now let Q1, Q2 > 0 be such that at least one is less than Qp. If Q1 = Q2, then Q1 =
(1/2)(Q1+Q2)+(1/2)0. Since Ψ
p(0) = 0, by the last statement of (v), Ψp(Q1) > (1/2)Ψ
p(Q1+
Q2) proving that Ψ
p(Q1 +Q2) < Ψ
p(Q1) + Ψ
p(Q2).
Finally let Q1 6= Q2 and w.l.o.g., suppose Q1 < Q2 and Q1 < Qp. Denote λ ≡ Q1/Q2 ∈
(0, 1). Then (a) Q1 = (1− λ)0 + λQ2 and (b) Q2 = λQ1 + (1− λ)(Q1 +Q2). Hence by (v),
we have
Ψp(Q1) > λΨ
p(Q2) and Ψ
p(Q2) > λΨ
p(Q1) + (1− λ)Ψp(Q1 +Q2)
where the inequalities are strict due to the last statement of (v). Adding the inequalities
above yields Ψp(Q1) + Ψ
p(Q2) > Ψ
p(Q1 +Q2).
Proof of Lemma 4 (i) Since Ψp(.) and Φ(.) are both monotonic and H(α) is strictly
increasing, the result follows by (21).
(ii) If H(α) > Qp, then (22) yields Π
p,α
S+R (α) = s(α) + a constant. Since s(α) is strictly
increasing for α ∈ [0, 1] (Lemma 3), (ii) follows.
(iii) Let H(α) < Qp. As s
′(α) = (1− α)F ′(α) (Lemma 3), (22) yields the first part, and
Π′′ pS+R(α) = [(1− α)F ′′(α)− F ′(α)]− c′′(H(α))[H ′(α)]2 + [p− 1− c′(H(α))]H ′′(α).
As F ′′(.) ≤ 0 (Assumption A1) and F ′(.) > 0, the first term of the expression above is
negative. Since c′′(.) < 0, the second term is negative. Since (a) H ′′(.) < 0 (Lemma 3) and
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(b) p− 1 > c′(H(α)) [by (6), since H(α) < Qp], the last term is also negative, proving that
Π′′ pS+R(α) < 0.
(iv) Let H(α˜) > Qp. The first statement follows by noting that H(α) is strictly decreasing
for α ∈ (α˜, 1] and H(1) = 0 < Qp (Lemma 3). The last statement follows by (ii).
(v) Since H(1) = 0 < Qp, (iii) applies for α = 1. As H
′(1) < 0 (Lemma 3) and c′(0) = 0,
taking α = 1 in (iii) yields Π′ pS+R(1) = (p− 1)H ′(1) < 0 which proves (iv).
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